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THE LEX FORI- BASIC RULE IN THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS
Albert A. Ehrenzweig*
A. LEx Fo~i: EXCEPTION OR RULE?
O NCE a court has taken jurisdiction, it will usually apply its
own law, unless the parties' own choice or an important
foreign fact, such as a foreign domicile, a foreign situs, or a foreign
conduct, appears to require application of another law. Most
judges and lawyers will agree with this simple proposition-and
yet text books, class notes, the Restatement, and even much lan-
guage of the courts, would have it otherwise: foreign domicile,
foreign situs, foreign conduct and other foreign "contacts" are said
a priori to require application of a foreign law, unless the court
can be persuaded for special reasons to turn to its own law or to
the law chosen by the parties. This blatant discrepancy between
the actual doing of the courts and "official" theory in the law of
conflict of laws has made an awesome mystery or an object of ridi-
cule of this subject in the eyes of many. The time has come for a
stock taking and re-evaluation of accepted techniques in the light
of practical needs, history and comparison.
* Walter Perry Johnson Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley.
Note. The following works (treatises and articles) will be referred to herein only by
the names of their authors: BATIFFOL, TRAArrl ]LPMENTAIRE DE DROrr INTERNATIONAL PRIVA,
2d ed. (1955); BE.ALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS OR PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAw (1916); CH.SHMa, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, 5th ed. (1957); DicEY, CONFLICT OF
LAws, 7th ed. (1958); EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAws (1959); FALCONBRmCE, ESSAYS ON Tim
CONFLICT OF LAWS, 2d ed. (1954); GAMILLSCHEG, Dan EINFLUSS DUMOULrNS AUF DE
ENTWICKLUNG DES KoLLISlONSR.ECiM (1955); Gutzwiller, "Le dfveloppment historique du droit
international privd," 29 Racua.m DES Coups 289 at 298 (1929). LAINA, INTRODUCTION AU
DRorr INTERNATIONAL PRIVA (1888); Meijers, "L'Histoire des principes fondamentaux au
droit international priv6 A partir du moyen Age," 49 RECUEIL DES COURS 547 (1934); NaU-
MEYER, DIE GEMEINRECHTLICHE ENTWICKELUNG DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVAT-UND STRAFRECIITS
W, BARTOLUS (1901, 1916); NiEDEREn, EINFi)HRUNG IN DIE ALLEMEINEN LENREN DES INTER-
NATIONALEN PRIVATRECHTS (1954); NUSSBAUM, PRINCIPLES OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw
(1943); QuADRI, LEzIONI Di Dinrrro INTERNAZIONALE PRIVATO, 2d ed. (1958); STORY, CoM-
MaNTARIES ON THE CONFUzcr oF LAws (1834); WoLFF, PRIVATa INTERNATIONAL LAW, 2d ed.
(1950).
I am indebted to Professor Rodolfo de Nova for many valuable suggestions offered
during the completion of my research at the University of Pavia.-AA.E.
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For several centuries courts have, in varying ways and degrees,
recognized foreign contracts or testaments which were valid under
the law of their execution, permitted an alleged wrongdoer to
show that he acted lawfully under the law of his conduct, or treated
the transfer of foreign land in accordance with the law of its situs.
Refinements have resulted in longer lists of such exceptions from
the basic rule of the law of the forum. But it should not have been
forgotten that foreign laws originally assumed these functions only
to fill vacua created by superior legal orders or the forum's self-
limitation. The Pope could and did prohibit the bishop from en-
forcing the law of his diocese against foreigners; the feudal creed
could and did prevent the court of Paris from applying its own law
to land in Lyon; the parties' choice could and did exclude the rules
of the forum; the United States Constitution and international
treaties can, and do at times, prohibit states from applying their
own laws "extraterritorially." In all these cases foreign laws have
supplemented, rather than displaced, a law of the forum limited
by superior orders. Self-limitations of that law have had the same
effect. Sister state customs were admitted in medieval Italy, where
city ordinances would in terms limit themselves to citizens. For-
eign customs were applied in feudal France, where seignorial courts
would grant (and expect) localization of statuta realia. The laws
of other sovereigns were extended courtesy in the Dutch provinces
whose laws in turn had disclaimed ubiquitous validity. The "civil
ley" of the world community of commerce was applied in English
courts merchant where the common law had denied itself to for-
eigners and foreign facts. And foreign laws were permitted to op-
erate by "analogy" where "unilateral" or "spatial" rules of mod-
ern codes provided for their application to nationals, domiciliaries
or domestic transactions.
These situations in which foreign laws have thus been called
upon to fill a vacuum could well have been collected and classified
in a catalogue of exceptions from the basic rule of the law of the
forum, governed by party autonomy on the one hand, Roman
common law, feudal order, natural law, the law merchant and
international law, on the other hand. Instead, in a gradual proc-
ess of academic petrification, which reached its climax after, and
perhaps because of, the disappearance or weakening of superior
orders and ideologies, doctrine has traded the fertile inconsisten-
cies and intricacies which would have characterized this scheme,
for the sterile consistencies and simplicities of dogmatic formulas,
which distinguish our current "official" law of conflict of laws.
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These formulas have in turn relegated both party autonomy and
the basic lex fori to the status of exceptions, and have, in spite or
rather because of their consistency and simplicity, brought this
branch of the law to the brink of defeat.
Beginning with D'Argentre's nearly all-embracing "statuta
realia," through Story's private "international" law, Savigny's
"seat" of legal relationships, and the English dogma of foreign-
created "obligations," to Holmes' "first principles of legal think-
ing," Beale's "vested rights," and the Restatement's "legislative
jurisdiction," forum and foreign laws have been made to "govern"
by virtue of postulates which have always required, and now lack,
foundation and sanction in a superior order. For, all of these
orders have long disappeared with the common law of Rome, the
feudal order of the Franks, the natural law of Grotius and Pufen-
dorf, and the "civil ley" of the English law merchant. And the
internationalist "creed" of the last century is on the wane.' Never-
theless, long obsolete ideologies have continued to serve as the
bases of the "official" conceptions and language of conflicts law,
and have thus caused much unnecessary difficulty and confusion
in American decisions, even in those of our most courageous courts
which have achieved justice in spite of the conceptions thus forced
on them. In a series of articles I have given many examples for
this judicial predicament in the conflicts law of torts and contracts
conflicts.2 Mention of two will suffice at this point.
A California citizen was killed in an automobile accident in
Arizona. In a California law suit the California defendant claimed
that the plaintiff's cause of action had died under "applicable" Ari-
zona law, although California had long abolished what even a
hundred years ago was felt to be a rule contrary to "justice," and
1
NUSSBAUM 26. This creed had resulted in "a transmutation of forceful liberal and
cosmopolitan tendencies into dogmas through a psychological process also observable
elsewhere."
2Ehrenzweig: "The Real Estate Broker and the Conflict of Laws," 59 COL. L. REV.
303 (1959); "The Statute of Frauds in the Conflict of Laws," 59 COL. L. REv. 874 (1959);
"Contracts in the Conflict of Laws," 50 COL. L. REv. 973, 1171 (1959); "Contractual Capacity
of Married Women and Infants in the Conflict of Laws," 43 MINN. L. REv. 899 (1959);
"Adhesion Contracts in the Conflict of Laws," 53 COL. L. Rav. 1072 (1953); Book Review,
12 J. LEGAL ED. 137 (1959); "The Place of Acting in Intentional Multistate Torts," 36
MINN. L. REv. 1 (1951); "Alternative Actionability in the Conflict of Laws of Enterprise
Liability," 63 Juanm. RE V. 39 (1951); "Guest Statutes in the Conflict of Laws," 69 YALE
L. J. 595 (1960); and my forthcoming articles, "Alienation of Affections in the Conflict of
Laws," 45 CORN. L. Q. -(1960); "Products Liability in the Conflict of Laws," "Vicarious
Liability in the Conflict of Laws," 69 YALE L. J. - (1960).
8 Beach v. The Bay State Co., 27 Barb. (N.Y.) 248 (1858).
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permitted the survival of tort actions. Nevertheless it took the
imaginativeness and scholarship of a progressive court to defeat
the defendant's seemingly conclusive insistence on the law of the
"place of the wrong" in order to do justice between two California
citizens according to California law. And in order to be able to
do so, the court had to resort to dogmatic language devised 700
years ago for totally different purposes.4
An uncle and his niece, both citizens of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, were traveling through Italy. Desirous of giving
his companion a valuable gift, the uncle handed his niece a sealed
envelope which contained shares in a Massachusetts corporation.
On his death his administrator claimed the shares, because the
validity of the transfer "is to be judged by the law of Italy, and...
certain formalities required by the law" had not been observed.
To the Massachusetts court "plainly that which was done in Italy
would have been sufficient, if it had been done in Massachusetts,
to effect a transfer of legal title to the shares." But, feeling com-
pelled to concede the plaintiff's argument with regard to the trans-
fer of movables in general, the court, in order to do justice between
two Massachusetts citizens according to Massachusetts law, had to
develop a special rule for shares of stock that may well become a
new source of confusion in future cases."
Decisions of this kind could be multiplied at will: from the
Connecticut automobile renting agency which could be held liable
in Connecticut under Connecticut strict liability law to a Con-
necticut citizen for a Massachusetts accident only because the court,
while conceding the "place of wrong" adage, was able to transform
a tort into a contract;7 to the contract valid under the law of Alaska,
the state of the domicile of both parties, which, having accidentally
been concluded in New York (where it was invalid) had to be
validated in Alaska by resort to renvoi;8 to the numberless cases in
4 Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. (2d) 859, 264 P. (2d) 944 (1953), per Traynor, J. To the
contrary, although conceding that "equity" might require another answer, Allen v.
Nessler, 247 Minn. 230 at 242, 76 N.W. (2d) 798 (1956), in unfortunate reliance on the
Restatement, Beale and Wharton, and authors of annotations.
5 Morson v. Second Nat. Bank of Boston, 806 Mass. 588, 29 N.E. (2d) 19 (1940), per
Qua, J.
6 As long as four centuries ago, Dumoulin, the great advocate of the principle of
autonomy, asked the question whether it would be desirable to apply the purely acci-
dental lex contractus to a sale between two foreigners traveling in Italy, of a house located
in their home country. MmEsJs 651.
7 Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 108 Conn. 33, 143 A. 168 (1928). See
also Graham v. Wilkins, 145 Conn. 34, 188 A. (2d) 705 (1958); Ehrenzweig, "Vicarious
Liability in the Conflict of Laws," 69 YALE L.J. - (1960).
8 Alaska Airlines v. Stephenson, (9th Cir. 1954) 217 F. (2d) 295.
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which American courts, in order to be able to apply their own law
to the American property of alien decedents, have had to apply
artificial techniques of the most varied kinds to justify their pref-
erence for American law.9
Less frequent, though more disturbing, are those cases in which
less courageous judges, or judges less familiar with the tools at
their disposal, have more or less grudgingly acquiesced in what
they thought to be compelling precedent, -and have done injustice
by refusing to apply their own laws. Few will be those to acclaim
the Alabama court which denied the injury claim of the Alabama
brakeman against the Alabama railroad under Alabama law for
negligent conduct committed in Alabama because the injury was
inflicted in Mississippi and the "Code of Alabama had no efficiency
beyond the lines of Alabama,"10 or the astounding ruling of an
Illinois court which, in 1958, denied recovery to an Illinois citizen
against Illinois tavern keepers for an injury sustained in an auto-
mobile accident caused by a driver to whom defendants had un-
lawfully sold liquor in violation of the Illinois Dram Shop Act-
because the place of the tort or wrong was Missouri, and its laws
determine "whether the act ... gives rise to a cause of action,""
or those cases in which courts have refused to limit liability under
their own guest statutes, or insisted on applying foreign statutes
of this type notwithstanding the fact that both parties were citizens
of the forum state and could not possibly have considered foreign
standards for their conduct simply because of crossing into another
state.12 In the field of contracts, cases are rare, but equally regret-
table, where courts have seen fit to sacrifice the parties' unambigu-
ous intention to the magic of words.'
The dogma which has so often either misled the courts during
the past few decades, or has forced them into artificial evasions or
reluctant acceptance, is being slowly-too slowlym- discredited and
9 See Yiannopoulos, "Wills of Movables in American International Conflicts Law:
A Critique of the Domidliary 'Rule,"' 46 CALIF. L. REV. 185 (1958).
10Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. Carroll, 97 Ala. 126, 11 S. 803 (1892).
11 Butler v. Wittland, 18 Ill. App. (2d) 578, 153 N.E. (2d) 106 (1958). Contra, Schmidt
v. Driscoll Hotel, 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W. (2d) 365 (1957), distinguished on clearly
inadequate grounds. See, in general, note, [1958] ILL. L. FORUM 287. Cf. Waynick v.
Chicago's Last Dept. Store, (7th Cir. 1959) 269 F. (2d) 322.
12 See, e.g., Loranger v. Nadeau, 215 Cal. 362, 10 P. (2d) 63 (1932). See, in general,
Ehrenzweig, "Guest Statutes in the Conflict of Laws," 69 YALE L.J 595 (1960).
18 For examples, see Ehrenzweig, "The Statute of Frauds in the Conflict of Laws,"
59 COL. L. REv. 874 (1959); "Contracts in the Conflict of Laws," 59 COL. L. Ra,. 973, 1171
(1960); "Contractual Capadty of Married Women and Infants in the Conflict of Laws,"
43 MINN. L. RaV. 899 (1959); "Releases of Concurrent Tortfeasors in the Conflict of Laws,"
46 VA. L. REv. - (1960).
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destroyed.1 4 This task will be rendered easier if we realize that,
by expressly treating traditional conflicts rules as exceptions from
a basic law of the forum, we would not abandon valuable achieve-
ments of a more refined era, nor return to a regrettable "provin-
cial" attitude, but, on the contrary, promote the actual application
of foreign law by improving and refining the rules pertaining to
specific typical situations. We would merely restore a highly cul-
tured, world-minded law but recently threatened by a nearly
world-wide sweep of a dogmatic conceptualism which has sacrificed
reality and the painstakingly and slowly progressing idealistic ra-
tionalism of centuries to ideological rather than idealistic formulas,
at the risk of losing everything and gaining nothing. We shall
continue, through international treaties, constitutional control and
determined scholarship, to strive for an ever-closer relation between
both the world's and the Union's legal systems. But I believe we
shall not be able to do so with any hope of success if we continue
to speak the language of an unattainable fantasy. Great scholars
everywhere, including the "local law" advocates in this country,
have long attacked the various techniques of the false internation-
alism underlying our recent conflicts law. We shall have to find
the courage to retrace our steps to that period of American law
in which the imaginative searching of a young society for new
answers to new problems was not yet obscured and emasculated
by the all-too-easy acquiescence in common-place generalizations,
a period in which courts still felt free to treat their own law as
primarily entitled to application unless displaced by the parties'
reliance on another law or similar compelling considerations.
By this return to earlier periods, the superstructure of the last
century need not be entirely lost. An important, though yet little-
explored achievement of "classic" conceptualism is the "adjust-
ment" to the concepts of forum law of the concepts of the appli-
cable foreign rule.'5 Moreover, there is merit in the compilation
of a catalogue of those principles which, though necessarily incon-
sistent with each other,' 6 like all principles of justice,"17 may, if
14 NUSSBAUm 26-32; and, in general, EmuNmzmcw 13.
'S See, e.g., Kegel, "Begriffs-und Interessenjurisprudenz im Internationalen Privat-
recht," FsrscmnuR FfDR LEWALD 259 at 282 (1953).
16 See Wengler, "Die Allgemeinen Rechtsgrunds5tze des Internationalen Privatrechts
und ihre Kollisionen," 23 6FFENTL. REcrr 473 (1943); Wengler, "Les principles g~n&aux
du droit international priv6 et leurs conifits," 41 R.v. CRrU. DE DR. INT. 595 (1952); 42
id. 37 (1953). See also Wengler, "Skizzen sur Lehre vom Statutenwechsel," 23 ZEr-rsMHuFr
PUR AUSLXNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PIVATRE HT 535 (1958) (hereinafter cited
RAErs Z.).
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applied consciously and without a priori priorities,"" assist the
judge in his decision: the forum's "political" interest including its
conception of its "public policy"; 9 the substantive harmony be-
tween laws applicable to a unitary set of facts, such as a family,20 a
decedent's estate or a contractual relationship; the reduction of
possible conflicts between the decision reached by the forum and
that likely to be reached by a foreign court as to the same facts;21
and perhaps the effectuating of as many party expectations as
possible. 22
Finally, acceptance of the lex fori as a basic rule and relegation
of traditional conflicts rules to the status of exceptions keyed to
ever narrower fact situations23 will not substantially alter their
scope and contents. Lex situs, lex loci and personal law will be
called upon, as they are now, to give better "conflicts justice" 24 than
the lex fori. But the judge will not have to rely on qualifications,
renvoi or public policy to justify his preference for his own or
another proper law,25 and applicability of the foreign law will in
each new situation have to be established to his satisfaction.
2
The following summary of this thesis will show its essential con-
nection with the progressing reform of the law of jurisdiction. 27
The Thesis
1. American courts have in fact nearly always given preference
to their own laws in the decision of conflicts cases, both interstate
17 BiNENFEL, REDIscovERY OF JusncE (1947). Kegel, "Begriffs-und Interessenjuris-
prudenz im Internationalen Privatrecht," FsiscsHnur Fi LEwALD 259 at 270 (1953),
develops a specific concept of "conflicts" justice.
18 Kegel, note 17 supra, at 268, against Wengler, "Die Allgemeinen RechtsgrundsRtze
des Internationales Privatrechts und ihre Kollisionen," 23 Z. 6FFENTL. RxaiT 473 at
497 (1943).
19 See, in general, Currie's articles cited in ERENnzw'IG 16.
20 As to "status," see, e.g., I RABEL, CONFLICr OF LAWS, 2d ed., 109 (1958). But cf.
EHRENZWEiG 85.
21 Kegel, note 15 supra, at 269, simplifying a longer catalogue of Wengler, note 16
supra. See also Zwegert, "Die dritte Schule im Internationalen Privatrecht," FrsSCHRFr
FUR RAAPE 35 (1948); Beitzke, "Betrachtungen zur Methodik im Internationalen Privat-
recht," FEsrscHRrr FUR SMFND 1 (1952).
22 See Kegel, note 17 supra, at 271. On the lex validitatis in contracts law, see
Ehrenzweig, "Contracts in the Conflict of Laws," 59 COL. L. REgv. 973 (1959).
28 Kegel, note 17 supra, at 279.
24 See Cavers, "A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem," 47 HARv. L. Rv. 173,
193 (1933); and, in general, EHRMNZWEIG 13.
25 See text accompanying notes 243-339 infra.
26 See Traynor, "Law and Social Change in a Democratic Society," [1956] ILL. L.
FORUM 230 at 234.
27 See, in general, EmuENzwniG 88, 120.
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and international, and have usually applied foreign law only in
situations where such preference was contrary to the intentions of
the parties or would have caused hardship on other grounds. The
first exception based on the parties' intention is so firmly estab-
lished that it may be regarded as the second basic rule.28 Other
propositions as to a priori "applicable" or "governing" law, such
as the lex loci delicti or situs, and particularly rules serving the
unity of status and estates, should be preserved, but only where, and
insofar as, they have sufficiently crystallized in certain specific
situations so as to be tenable as other exceptions from a basic lex
fori.2
9
2. The converse treatment of the lex fori as an exception
from such a priori propositions, far from being based on -"logical"
postulates or practical exigencies, is the heritage of academic aber-
rations in the history of conflicts law. The latest of these aberra-
tions, in this country as well as abroad, is an internationalist or
universalist ideology which has established a fictitious allocation
of "competencies" thought to entitle the several laws to ubiquitous
application according to a small number of broad and vague
formulas.30 This ideology has forced American courts to justify
the actual application of their own law or the law intended by
the parties, by various artificial devices such as arbitrary Iocaliza-
tions of allegedly decisive contacts, procedural characterization,
renvoi and resort to public policy. The current decline of this
ideology will facilitate the abandonment of these academic ex-
ercises, which is suggested in the final part of this article, and
the return to the lex fori as the basic principle, which alone can
remove the prevailing uncertainty and confusion.
3. Conscious recognition of this basic principle would con-
centrate our effort on a search for a scheme of international and
interstate jurisdiction which would secure a lex fori properly ap-
plicable in view of a substantial contact of the court with parties
or facts. Such an effort would be assisted by the current extension
of traditional jurisdictional concepts and their concomitant limi-
tations under what may broadly be called a doctrine of forum
conveniens.
4. Once the ascertainment of a convenient forum would thus
have become the primary object of the law of conflict of laws,
28 Note 22 supra.
29 Note 2 supra.
30 For a bibliography, see MAmu, Grscmcrra UND SYSmrM DES INTEmAToNALEN PRIVAT-
REGcls 8 (1892).
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conflicts rules, insofar as they are not established by constitutional
limitations"1 or international conventions,2 would, upon a com-
parative analysis of forum and foreign policies, come into play
primarily in determining whether the defendant would be un-
fairly dealt with under the law of the forum, and where govern-
mental interests otherwise require displacement of that law.
The third proposition has been extensively discussed in the
first part of my book on the Conflict of Laws dealing with "Juris-
diction and Judgments. ' ' 2a Full proof of the fourth proposition
will have to await a detailed analysis of all typical situations, a
contribution to which I hope to offer in a series of articles and
in the second part of my book. In order to establish the first
two propositions, a historical and comparative analysis will demon-
strate that, besides party autonomy,33 application of the lex fori
has always been the basic principle of conflicts law and was merely
temporarily displaced from time to time. So clearly has the lex
fori been prevalent all through history that our discipline even
lacked a name until the internationalist period of the last century,
when the conflicting claims of foreign laws produced both the
"Conflict of Laws"3 4 and "Private International Law."3 5  Inso-
far as the following analysis is concerned with the doctrine of
earlier centuries, it must partly be based on conjecture. This doc-
trine followed largely scholastic tradition and did not necessarily
reflect living law. I believe, however, that the interpretations
offered in these pages, have strong support in available authority,
and that these interpretations, if found tenable, could go a long
way toward destroying the dangerous idols of current dogma and
restoring the lex fori to its rightful place. This historical analysis
will follow the sequence in which the several countries originally
entered upon the world scene of private international law. 6
31 See Currie, "The Constitution and the Choice of Law," 26 UNV. Cm. L. Rzv. 9
(1958). But d. EHaNrzwxo 29.
32 See, e.g., the Hague resolution of August 30, 1875, INSTITrT DE Daorr INTERNATIONAL,
TABrEAu G-NI RAL DES RESOLUTIONS (1873-1956) 365 (1957). On the pertinent conventions
on specific jurisdictional subjects, see EHRFxzwxiG 23.
82a EHEENZWEIG, passim. For an excellent foreign analysis, see Neuhaus, "Internatlo-
nales Zivilprozessrecht und Internationales Privatrecht," 20 RABES Z. 201 at 247-269 (1955).
33 Note 22 supra.
34 This term is usually ascribed to Huber. See NUSSBAUm 7. But see also note 148 infra.
85 Story is the creator of this phrase. NussBAum 7.
36 Primary sources have been extensively used in this analysis. Since most of these
sources are in foreign languages, references are, however, prevailingly to the classic studies
by Laind, Neumeyer, Meijers, and Gutzwiller. See Note, p. 637 supra.
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B. HISTORY AND COMPARISON
1. Italy
The great fulfillment of Roman law as a jus gentium gov-
erned the Empire. As the law prevailing in all fora, it excluded
conflict. 37  Ambiguously, the beginning of conflicts law is often
identified with the general regime of "personal laws" within
the several territories of the conquering Germanic tribes.38 But
conflict of laws in our sense can arise only from a competition be-
tween a lex fori and foreign laws, and there was no such lex
fori to contest the free reign of each litigant's own law.39 Nor
was there such competition when those great "personal" laws,
the perfected and later declining "lex" of the Langobards,40 and
the defeated and later rising laws of the Romans4 1 had yielded, as
had the King's powers, to the feudal laws, the Frankish capitu-
laria 4 2 and the customs and statutes of the city states.43 All of these,
though on different grounds, claimed general "territorial" applica-
tion to both citizens and foreigners, to the exclusion of all foreign
laws; and the lex fori ruled supreme4 4 confirmed in its rule by
treaties among the city states.45 It would be wrong to treat this
stage as one of primitive unawareness of inequities thus caused.
37 See, e.g., Yntema, "The Historic Bases of Private International Law," 2 AM. J.
COMP. L. 297 at 800 (1953); BATIFFOL 10; Niederer, "Ceterum quaero de legum Imperii
Romani conflictu," FasrscHtuFr FarrzscHn 115 (1952); SciwiND, GExmrra UND ZsrO-
RiscHE GRUNDLAGEN DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECHTS (1959).
8 See, in general, MEIJERS 549; CALIssE, A HISTORY or ITALIAN LAW 39 (1928). But
see QUADRI 32-42.
391 NEUMEYER 11; BATIFFOL 11; MEIjERS 572. The translation of "Stamm" by "tribe"
is misleading since we are dealing with highly organized and advanced communities
rather than with primitive hordes. Concerning the fundamental difference between the
"personal laws" of that period and that following the regime of an integrated lex fori
in the 10th century, see 1 NEUMEYEu 14. As to the gradual decline of the old personal
laws, through the return of Roman law, the parties' choice, and needs of commercial
intercourse, see 1 NEUMEYmE 143, 147, 160.
40 At the time of the Frankish conquest in 774, Lombard law had reached the stage of
its highest development as the "best law nearly generally known." 1 NEUmEymE 23, re-
ferring to a statement by King Liutprand.
41 Roman law had persisted and was rejuvenated as both local and universal law.
1 NEUMEYER 44-50. For its co-existence with Lombard law, see id. at 57, 134.
42 1 NEUMEYER 29-33; BATIFFOL 13; WOLFF 21. See, in general, Boarrius, DIE CA'rru-
LAIUEN iM LANGOBARDENREICH 14 (1864); ABIGNENTE, STORIA DEL ntrrro IN ITALIA 186 (1884).
43 1 NEUMEVER 39, 59, 65, 70.
44 2 NEUMEY:R 1, 13; Gurzwa.va 298.
45 The oldest treaty is that between Pisa and Amalfi assuring the merchants of each
party of treatment under the lex fori. 2 NEUMEYER 5. Apparently as a courtesy to the
neighboring state, criminal jurisdiction was extended to crimes committed abroad. 2
N umuEYRm 29.
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The city judge applied the Roman rules of competency.46 Since the
primary tenet of these rules was the parties' subjection to the court
of the defendant's domicile as his "forum generale," 47 application
of this forum's law would neither aggrieve the defendant nor the
foreign plaintiff.48 On the other hand, a foreign defendant could
hardly complain if the added competencies of the place of con-
tracting,49 of the delict,50 of the thing in issue,51 made applicable
a forum law which had the most significant contacts with the case.
52
Nor was injustice done where a Venetian's will executed abroad
was subjected to Venetian law by a Venetian statute.5 3
But the lex fori, after a regime of one hundred years, was
rendered inadequate at the beginning of the thirteenth century,
when, presumably in part because of the revived influence of
Roman law,5 4 foreigners were deprived of both the burdens55 and
the privileges of forum law.56 This development seems to have oc-
curred rather abruptly, although around 1200 Aldricus had opened
the first breach in the lex fori when he referred the judge to the
"stronger and more useful law."57 Accursius, as late as 1228, had
quite generally permitted the place of litigation to determine the
applicable custom. 58  But only a few years later, this great master
46 2 NEUMEYER 23. On the early identity between problems of jurisdiction and choice
of law, see ME.JEas 572.
47 2 NEUMEYER 94.
48 2 NEUMEYER 30, 80, 82.
49 This competency found a counterpart in the cities' revenue interest in the "cura-
tura," a levy on local contracts of foreigners. 2 NEUMEYEP 81. On the impact of usury
legislation, see id. at 32.
50 2 NEUMEYER 31.
51 On the financial background of this competency, see 2 NEuMEYER 33.
52 Paulus de Castro (died 1441) limits the Roman principle that the plaintiff must
and may follow the defendant in his own forum (actor debet sequi forum rei), to the
case of a foreign defendant sued in contract or quasi-contract and about to depart from
the forum. 1 LAINt 189.
58 See GTmi.R 299.
542 NEUM EYER 73. See also id. at 23 ("invention of the theoreticians'). On the in-
fluence of Byzantine law in Bologna, see Pringsheim, "Beryt and Bologna," FEsrscinrr
Ffl LENEL 204 (1921).
55 Thus, a citizen of Pisa defended himself successfully in Pistoja against the charge of
having carried arms there unlawfully, by pleading his citizenship. 2 NEUMEYER 75, n. 4.
And a statute of the CittAL de Castello which required an owner seeking to recover stolen
goods from a bona fide purchaser to reimburse him for the purchase price, was held in-
applicable in that city against a citizen of Arezzo. 2 NEUMEYER 79.
56 Even against a counteraction the foreigner could not invoke forum law in his favor.
Albericus de Rosate, statutis II 9, cited 2 NEumEYER 78. See also MEIJERS 594.
572 NEUMEYER 66, 101. For a related canon law doctrine, see 2 NEUMEYER 131.
582 NEUMEYER 60, 66, 76, 101. See, in general, LANDSBERG, DiE GLOSSE DES Accu sRsius
UND aE LEzsa vom EIGErTUM (1883). Concerning Azo's similar theory, see 2 NEUMEYER
59, n. 1; MEijERs 594.
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of the Gloss made the now famous concession that in Modena the
citizen of Bologna must not be adjudged under the laws of
Modena. 59
What, then, was the foreigner's law in Modena? "At first there
seemed to present itself an easy solution. Local laws were consid-
ered mere modifications of the common law which bound every-
body everywhere. What was simpler than to apply this very
common law to the foreigner?" 60 But this easy solution could not,
in the long run, satisfy new needs. It was at this point that the
inventiveness of scholars devised the first casuistic rules of conflict
of laws. Indeed, "the groping and uncertain experiments of those
scholars constitute the starting points for all theoretical endeavors
which our time continues to employ in private international law." 61
To fill a gap, then, a gap left by the self-limitation of the lex
fori and the failure of the common law, the canonists, as well as,
independently, secular scholars led by Jacobus Balduini and Uber-
tus de Bobio, having first found the law of the forum applicable to
foreigners as to contracts made in the forum state, began, con-
versely, to apply foreign laws to foreign contracts.62 And it was
similarly to fill a gap that courts upheld testaments made by
citizens abroad not only under the lex fori, but under the foreign
law as well.63 These conflicts rules, without displacing the lex fori,
thus had come to its rescue. Wherever the lex fori was willing to
operate, it retained its effect,64 far from conceding to the foreign
law a right to "govern" a legal relation; 6 and it is fundamental
for the understanding of this origin of all private international
law that probably all of its early rules were at least explained by
59 See, e.g., Yntema, "The Historic Bases of Private International Law," 2 Am. J. ComiP.
L. 297 at 302 (1953); 2 NEUMEYER 76.
60 2 NEUMEYER 82.
612 NEUMEYER 83. The same period also saw the creation of that differentiation be-
tween procedural and substantive law which has remained a principal tool of our theory.
2 NEumFsYER 85, 88.
62 2 NEuMEYER 84, 102.
63 2 NEUMEYER 45; 2 LAiNA 338; PAPRA, L REGLA "Locus REGIT AcruM" Y LA FORMA
DE LOS TMESAMENTOS 30, 34, 52 (1955). As to the relevance of the situs, see PAuRA 27, 48, 60.
The famous "English question," debated by Bartolus and his contemporaries (Italian
estate of Englishman), foreshadows the broadening of the conflicts rule. GuTzwmLm 315.
See also MEijERs 597, 608 on the influence of the school of Orleans.
64 Where jurisdiction was based on the place of contracting, a Modena court would
adjudicate a Modena contract under Modena law even as to a Bologna citizen. 2 Nxu-
mEYER 84. This seems to have been true also where jurisdiction was based on the defend-
ant's domicile (2 NEUMEYER 94) or where the foreigner was not familiar with the lex
contractus (2 NEUMEYEm 137).
65 See notes 70, 72 infra.
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the "principle of the parties' autonomy,"6 6 which later conceptual-
ist dogma was to betray to the lasting detriment of doctrine and
practice.
To be sure, the Commentators, following their academic lean-
ing toward generalization and faithful to the persisting idea of an
all-embracing law of Rome, 7 were ultimately inclined to grant to
foreign law, at least in a few specific situations, the same claims to
extraterritorial application which earlier they had granted to the
lex fori6 8 Their ever-recurring invocation of the clearly inap-
plicable imperial decree of Cunctos Populos in the very titles of
their works makes this more than likely.69 But, contrary to later
misinterpretations, most dramatically exemplified in Professor
Beale's mis-translation of Bartolus,7 0 the earlier Italian Commenta-
tors had, in general, recognized the priority of the lex fori by
organizing their analysis around the effectiveness of the lex fori
as to either foreigners before the forum or forum citizens abroad.71
Balduini had merely asked the forum to "inspect" the customs of
the place where the contract was located.7 2 The same language was
still used by Bartolus3  (1314-1355) and Baldus74  (1327-1400).
Only Salicet may be said to have foreshadowed later dogma which
may well have been promoted by the universalist tendencies of a
canon law coordinated by the Pope's sovereignty. 75 It seems that
in what was probably the most frequent conflicts situation, namely
the case involving a foreigner's contract, the court would take juris-
diction over the foreigner as the court of the place of contracting,
in the expectation that the judgment would be recognized by the
06 MErimts 633 with primary reference to the writings of Salicet.
67 MarjEs 630.
68 NEmDR 38.
09 Codex Justinianus 1.1.1. This technique was used all through history from Accursius
to d'Argentr6. NmDmaR 89.
70 B.AE, BARTOLUS ON THE CoNFLIcr OF LAws 18 (trans. 1914), consistently translates
the word "inspicitur" by "govern." 1 LAiNt 135 correctly translates: "Rl faut consid~rer,"
and "il faut avoid 6gard." But see also VAN DE KAMP, BARTOLUS DE SAXOFmMATO 1313-1357
235 (1936) ("geldt het recht').
71As to the international criminal law of Bartolus and his successors, see Marz,
BARTOLUS ALS HAUPT DER EaSTEN SCHULE DES INTERNATIONALEN STRARMCIM 30, 43 (1908).
722 NEUMEYER 86 ("inspicitur," "spectatur').
73 See note 70 supra.
74 Baldus de Ubaldis (1327-1400), in his COMMENTAEAi N PRImUM, SECUNDUM ET T-
TIUM CODICIS LMRUM, DE SUMMA TmrrATE, L. 1, no. 57 (ed. Augustae Taurinorum
1576). This work deals almost exclusively with the newly discovered "personal law."
Note 40 supra.
75 Note 91 infra.
1960] 649
MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
foreigner's home state.76 Although Salicet (died 1412) would
insist that also a foreign lex contractus "shall" be applied,7 he, too,
returned to the lex fori where the contract was to be performed
in the forum state.78 Rochus Curtius (died 1495) was perhaps
first generally to discuss the applicability of foreign "customs." 79
But court practice even then seems to have largely ignored dog-
matic developments, 8 0 and further generalizations were left to the
French statutists.81
Passing over less significant writers, such as Chasseneuz (died
1541) and Tiraqueau (died 1558), Dumoulin (1500-1566) may
perhaps be considered as the last exponent of the Italian school.
He, too, refrains, with certain traditional exceptions, from ascer-
taining a "governing" law and is satisfied with examining the limits
of a lex fori which he supplemented by the ubiquitous applica-
bility of the common law and the test of natural justice. 2  Indeed,
to his contemporaries, Dumoulin seems to have been an advocate
of the primary rule of the lex fori. 3 It may not be a coincidence
that this scholar, who kept himself free of later conceptualistic
generalizations, is also often credited with having re-emphasized
in the law of conflict of laws the great principle of the autonomy
of the parties, and that it was in turn this great principle which
has remained the object of contempt and attack by those preferring
neat dogma to living law. 4
Perhaps it was fortunate for Italy's legal history that, for the
next two centuries, political upheavals virtually excluded her
76 See, for early French law, Neumeyer, "Zur Geschichte des internationalen Privat-
rechts in Frankreich und den Niederlanden," 11 Z=r. FOR V6umtREnu r 190 at 192, 195
(1920).
77 B]ARTHOLOaMAEUS A SALICE'rO, PARs PRImA IN PRIMUM aT SECUNDUM CODICIS LIBROS,
L. cunctos populos, no. 4 ff. (1574), L. 6, tit. 2, lib. XXI, Dig., uses the phrase "caveri
oportet."
78 1 LAINA 180.
79 Rocnus Cu'rnus, TPACrATUS UIuusQuE Juus, tit. II, 376 (1584) uses in the head-
ing of the second part the phrase "an judex debeat equi."
80 This observation has been based on such statements as that of Coquille (1523-1603),
according to whom the French coftumes are not to be treated as "local to the same extent
as the Docteurs ultramontains have considered their Statutes" (trans). 2 CoQumLE, OEuvars,
Las CousruMES DU rAYS rr coMTA DE Nrvmmois 1 (1703). Cf. GAMmiLSCH 98. See also
NmERR 37; 1 LANA 300. CALAsso, LEzIONI Di SrORIA DEL DiRl'rO ITALANO, rev. ed.,
317 (1948), refers to Cujas' criticism of the commentators for being "verbose as to easy
matters, silent as to difficult ones, and diffuse in a narrow spot." (trans). Simply to ascribe
Coquille's anti-statutism to his resentment of the Lutheran Dumoulin's attack against his
uncle Bourgoin, a Catholic, is hardly justifiable. DUN, LA CoU3TUME DE NIVN~As 432
(1864).
81 Note 105 infra.
82 GAMILLcw 73, 88, 93.
83 GAMILIscHFG 33, 98.
84 See 1 LAuI- 223; GAMmscmSGE 110-124.
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from the arena of conflicts scholarship which during that period
was largely one of dogmatic deviation."5 Yet it was only two years
after Sardinia's defeat in 1851 that Italian scholarship was to set
the stage for another great victory when Mancini (1817-1888) in
a now famous speech added the political ideas of his country's
resorgimento to the European concert of internationalist doctrine.',
Supported by the reforms of the French Code,8 7 he urged the
nationality principle as the primary basis of a truly international
conflicts law. Its force was spent in an unparalleled impact on
legislation and literature at home and abroad."" In Italy, too, the
international dream has yielded to a new "territorial" realism,8 9
which may or may not coincide with the peculiarly Italian doctrine
of "incorporation" authorizing the judge, in applying his own
law, to incorporate foreign laws in that law by a creative actY0
2. The Canon Law
As in the secular law of the Italian city states, the lex fori
governed supreme in early canon law.91 And as in the secular
law of the Italian city states, the lex fori of the canon law at one
time met situations which seemed to require its withdrawal. But
problem and solution differed substantially in the two laws. While
the laws of the Italian cities had denied their own applicability
85 It seems that the treatise by Rocco, TRATrATO DI DIRITrO CIVILE INTERNAZIONALE
(originally published in 1837, ed. 1859), which adopts a natural law ideology, was unable
to survive the impact of Mancini's work. See BAR, DAS INTERNATIONALE PRIVAT-UND
STraFREcr 44 (1862).
86 MANCINI, DELL.A NAZIONALITA COME FONDAMENTO DEL DIRITTO DELLE GENTI (1851).
See also MANCINr, LA vrrA DFl POPOLI NELL' UMANITA (1872). Among others, Mancini relied
on the teachings of Savigny (note 155 infra) and Westlake (note 169 infra). See also
1 CLUNET 221 at 230 (1874).
87 See LEREBOURS-PIGEONNdME, DROrr INTERNATIONAL PRivi, 7th ed., 83-88 (1959).
88 The Codice Civile Italiano of 1865 (amended 1942) and the Spanish Civil Code of
1889 relied largely on Mancini. See, in general, NIEDERER 66; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIhRE,
note 87 supra, at 331.
89 See, e.g., AGo, TEoRIA DEL DnmTro INTERNAZIONALE PRIVATO 59-94 (1934); BALLA-
DORE-PALLImu, Dmrrro INTERNAZIONALE PRivATO, 2d ed., 9-11 (1950); De Nova, "Solu-
tion du conflit de lois et rglement satisfaisant du rapport international," 37 RtEV. Cur.
DE DR. INT. 178 (1948); MORELLI, ELEMENTI DI Dmrrro INTERNAZIONALE PRlVATO ITALIANO,
6th ed., 20-23 (1959); PACCHoNI, ELEMENTI DI Dnurro INTERNAZIONALE PRIVATO 111-122
(1930); QuADa 168-289. For bibliographies, see, e.g., De Nova, "La jurisprudence italienne
en mati&e de conflits de lois de 1935-1949," 39 Rxv. CRIr. DE DR. INT. 159-162 (1950);
NmmuR 69; BATIFFOL 258, 278.
90 This theory is often identified with the name of Anzilotti [STUDI CRTCI Di DsnnTo
INTERNAZIONALE PRIVATO (1898)]. See, e.g., Ago, "R.gles Gdnrales des Conflits de Lois," 58
RECUEIL DES CouPs 243 at 303 (1936); Esperson, "Le Droit International Priv6 dans la
Idgislation italienne," 6 CLUNEr 329 (1879); 7 id. at 245, 337 (1880). See also NiEDaER 371;
1 RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAws, A COMPARATVE STUDY, 2d ed., 16, 62 (1958).
912 NEUMEYER 126. See also RIGAUD, AcIm DU CONGRis DE DROIT CANONIQUE (1950).
1960]
MICHIGAN LAW REVIEw
to foreigners and foreign facts, the clerical judge found himself
unable to apply his law for other reasons. Delegation of judicial
authority was the rule and neither the delegating nor the dele-
gated judge seemed entitled to his own law.92 Moreover, the right
to appeal to a judge in another territory raised the question as to
the law applicable in the appellate court.93 Perhaps in part for these
reasons the parties were given the right to choose their own judge
and their own law long before similar rights were available in
secular courts.9 4 That, in the absence of such choice, the defend-
ant's law was given preference95 is additional support for the as-
sumption that the law of the forum, i.e., typically the law of the
defendant's domicile, had even then remained the law entitled to
primary consideration. 6
As in the Italian city states more complex fact situations re-
quired greater refinement. Here, as there, other laws were per-
mitted to aid the lex fori where it had become deficient. And here,
as there, contracts and testaments led the way,9 7 with delicts fol-
lowing suit.98 But canon law, too, even earlier than its secular
counterpart, prompted by its coherence under one sovereign, suc-
cumbed to dogma. Pope Boniface VIII (1294-1303), in his Decre-
tale Ut Animarum (1298), had decreed that the bishop's ordinance
threatening excommunication for latceny, did not bind his subjects
outside the diocese, because, in the words of the Roman jurist
Paulus, "nobody may pronounce law (jus dicere) outside his own
territory." 99  Although Paulus' adage referred to judicial rather
than to legislative jurisdiction,100 even a contemporaneous Gloss
extended the Decretale to restrict the legislative power as such,10'
precluding the forum from applying its own law to foreigners or
foreign transactions, or a foreign law to citizens or domestic trans-
actions. It may be regrettable that the final text of the Codex Juris
Canonici preserved this theorem by presuming every law to be
92 2 NEUMEYER 129.
93 2 NEuaMYEi. 129. For analogies in early French feudal law, see Neumeyer, "Zur
Geschichte des internationalen Privatrechts in Frankreich und den Niederlanden," 11 Zmr.
rif V6Lx auci-r 190 at 195 (1920).
94 2 NwmnE 129.
95 2 NEUMEYER 113.
96 2 NEUMEYER 132. An exception existed where the plaintiff's law was more favorable
to the defendant or was more likely to do justice. 2 NEUM-YEt 131.
97 2 NEUMEyEm 131, 135.
98 2 NEUMEYER 138.
99 DiG. 2, 1, 20.
100 PACELLi, LA PERSONNALrI Er LA TEnIuaLrrA DES LOIS PARTICULdMWE'T DAN5 LE
DRorr CANON 2 (1945).
101 Id. at 5.
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territorial. 02 To be sure, an earlier draft,'0 3 conversely favoring a
presumption of personality, would have similarly recognized a
regime of rigid rules. But the reversal, thus proposed, of an age-old
formula might have strengthened those other provisions of the
Code which may mark a trend back to the pre-Bonifacian lex
fori. 0 4
3. France
The spouses De Ganey, domiciliaries of Paris, had made each
other heirs of all their after-acquired property. In a dispute be-
tween the heirs of husband and wife the former claimed a piece
of land in Lyon as not having been included in the mutual gift.
That gift had been made under the community property law of
the Paris Coutume, it was claimed, which lacked extraterritorial
validity in Lyon, a city subject to the Roman droit Jcrit. The
Bartolist and royalist Dumoulin rendered a famous opinion favor-
ing application by the Paris judge of his own law which, through
the contract, had been deprived of its local character. 0 5 Lex fori,
then, and party autonomy, even as to foreign land!1 6
To d'Argentr6'0 7 this opinion was intolerable. In his all-per-
vasive desire to support Breton feudalism against the King by
giving priority to the lex situs as to Breton land, he felt compelled
to oblige the judge equally to apply the lex situs to foreign land. 08
Whatever the rationale of this obligation-and there are almost
as many interpretations as authors dealing with this question' 09-
the lex fori had found its limitation, one not self-imposed or sug-
gested by the common law, like the limitation of the Italian city
laws, nor decreed by the sovereign, like the limitations of the sev-
eral jurisdictions of the canon law. Rather, the feudalist displace-
ment of the law of the forum was demanded by a political ideology
102 Codex Juris Canonici, Canon 12.
103 Draft 1914, Canon 7, quoted Pacelli, note 100 supra, at IV.
104 Codex Juris Canonici, Canon 14, §1, no. 1.
105 See, e.g., D'ESPINAY, LA FAoDALITA El LE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 343 (1862); GAMILL-
scnma 42.
106 As to French antecedents, see MEijEgs 549. For a different view of the controversy,
see NEUMEYER, "Zur Geschichte des internationalen Privatrechts in Frankreich und den
Niederlanden, 11 ZEIr. FUR V6LKEzREcHT 190 at 199 (1920).
107D'ARGENTRA (1519-1590), COMMENTARY IN PATRUS BmrONUM LEGES SEU CONSUE-
TUDINEs GENEPALs ANTIQUISSIMI DUCATUS BRITANNIAE, Art. CCVIII, Gloss 6 (ed. Paris
1621).
108 GAmII.ISCHEG 103, 202. See also 1 CATEtLANI, IL DMrrro INTERNAZIONALE PRIVATO,
2d ed., 441 (1895), citing De la Lande de Calan's dissertation (1892); Nunmu 46.
1o9 See GAMmLc~imO 104.
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to which that law had to yield the power over land,110 and perhaps
by that nascent internationalism l ' which, too, endowed the foreign
law with a right to recognition. 112
If d'Argentr6 had stopped at this point, he could have retained
in his scheme the predominance of the lex fori with the one great
exception of the lex situs. 1 ,3 But the great scholar, judge and legis-
lator did not stop there. His was the urge for a simplification of
the administration of justice in his native Brittany, his a pre-
dominant concern for those feudal interests which were just then
facing the first stage of their decline. If statuta realia, the laws
governing land, were to gain the great standing he desired for
them, he may well have wished to restore an at least apparent
balance by giving imperative effect, also, to those ancient statuta
personalia, which are carried about by everybody "wherever he
may go."' 1 4
The inevitable inconsistency between these two principles has
often been pointed out.1 5 The all-importance of a "territorialism"
purporting to embrace all legal relations as to forum land seems
irreconcilable with the forum's duty, though secondary, to recog-
nize as to such land personal laws "created" by another sovereign.
D'Argentr6, the feudalist, attempted to minimize this inconsistency
by reducing, as far as possible, the scope and impact of the foreign
personal laws intruding on the forum law of the situs."16 But
neither later scholars nor the courts followed suit. 1 7 The conflict
remained unresolved, and the lex fori continued, openly or in
disguise,"1 to determine French law until the eve of the great
110 GAMILLScHEG 104.
11 1 LAiNA 270.
112For antecedents, see GAMmuLSc;HE 105; Neumeyer, "Zur Geschichte des interna-
tionalen Privatrechts in Frankreich und den Niederlanden," Zm-r. FOR VOLKMZRECHT 190
at 193 (1920).
113 The regime of the lex situs has since been surrounded by something close to a
psychological taboo. See in general, EmI.E~zwmar 206. For early history, which can be traced
back to 1270. see BATIFFOL 261.
114 D'A RrFNTR, note 107 supra, at no. 4. See 2 LAmiN 820.
"t5 2 LAiNA 822.
116 This D'Argentr6 sought to achieve by subjecting the statuta mixta to the regime of
the statuta realia without regard to a possible preponderance of their personal character
(which Dumoulin had conceded), and by limiting the effect of personal statutes to those
which purport to affect the "general status," to the exclusion of those which "merely create
a limited incapacity." D' ARGENTRL, note 107 supra, at no. 14. See 2 LAI N 324. For criti-
cism of the resulting predominance of the lex for, see 2 LATNi 316; BATIFFOL 267.
117 2 LAIN 88, 389, 394; DELAUME, Las CONFLITS DE LOIS A LA VEILLE DU CODE CIvIL
838 (1947).
118 Concerning the continued impact of the lex fori through the process of qualifica-
tion, the renvoi, and the ordre public, see DELAUME, note 117 supra, at 49, 98, 114.
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codification and beyond.19 In this form, strengthened by Dutch
influence1 20 French doctrine, in the writings of Boullenois (1680-
1762), Bouhier (1673-1746), Froland (+ 1746), and Merlin,' 21
came to play its important role, shared with that of Dutch and
German scholars, in the formative process of American conflicts
law.122 This American law was in turn partly responsible for that
internationalist affliction which for a considerable period was
to hem the natural development of French conflicts law. 23 Foelix,
the author of the first French treatise of the 19th century, an-
nounced flatly his "complete adoption" of Story's teaching. 24 But
it was Savigny whose internationalist idealism probably gave the
decisive impulse to that dogmatic deviation which culminated in
the work of Pillet, Beale's great French counterpart. 25
It would seem, however, that in France, too, the restoration of
the lex fori is around the corner. Notwithstanding Niboyet's some-
what ambivalent support of Pillet's teaching, 26 Bartin's realism has
prevailed' 27-though veiled in a universalist aura of philosophy
110 See, in general, id. at 86, 836; and Delaume, "The French Civil Code and Conflict of
Laws: One Hundred and Fifty Years After," 24 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 499 (1956).
120 Apparently Boullenois himself had been strongly influenced by the Dutch doctrine.
2 LaiNk 426.
121 See 2 LAmt 418; GAMILLSCHEG 185; BATIFFOL 271. The main contribution of these
authors has been seen in their revival of Dumoulin's autonomy of the parties and their
refinement of the law of succession. BATriOL 273.
122 Boullenois' work [TRArrt DE LA PE.SONNALIT ET DE LA RiALriT DE LOIX, COurUMES,
ou sTArTUs (1766)] was one of the main sources of Story's Commentaries. See also GAMILL-
scan 247; BEALE 44.
123 See Louis-Lucas, "Conflits de mfthodes en matire de conflits de lois," 83 CLuNE-
774 at 780 (1956) (with English translation). For an earlier adherent of the lex fori (based
on a rational system of jurisdiction), see G~AD, CODE DES *nAx1GERs ou krAT civya Er
POLITIQUE EN FRANCE (1853).
124 FOELIX, TRA1rA DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL PRivA 12 (1843). See VAnm.Es-SoM-
MIb.ES, LA SYNTH.SE DU Daorr INTERNATONAL PKiVA 165 (1897); BATIFFOL 284. On MASSE,
LE DROIT COMMERCIAL DANS SES RAPPORTS AVEC LE DROIT DES GENS Er LE DROrr CIVIL (1884),
see BAR, DAs INTERNATIONALE STRAF-UND PRIVATRECHT 45 (1862).
125 See BATIFFOL 280; Louis-Lucas, note 123 supra, at 803.
126 See, e.g., Niboyet, "Territoriality and Universal Recognition of Rules of Conflict of
Laws," 65 HARv. L. REV. 582 (1952). Recognition, at the outset, "that attempts to achieve
a universal private international law have failed" is in peculiar contrast to Niboyet's
advocacy of unilateral conflicts rules. See also Makarov, "Der allgemeine Teil des inter-
nationalen Privatrechts im Entwurfe des neuen franzasischen Kodifikationswerkes,"
FEs-rscmu-r FijR WoLxF 247 at 261 (1952); LoUSSOUARN, "The French Draft on Private
International Law and the French Conference on Codification of Private International
Law," 5 INT. & CoMp. L. Q. 378 (1956).
127 BATIFFOL 289. See also, e.g., Louis-Lucas, "Existe-t-il une competence gdndrale
du droit franqais pour le rcglement des conflits de lois?" 48 Rxv. Cirr. DE DR. INT. PRivA
405 (1959); Maury, "Rgles gn~rales des conflits de lois," 57 RECUmL DES COURS 329-563
(1936).
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and aesthetics in the great work of Batiffo. 12 1 Thus, in the law of
torts no less an authority than Mazeaud'2 9 has expressly advocated
the outright application of the lex fori.-30
4. Netherlands
What d'Argentre's feudalistic theorem did not achieve in
France, it did apparently at first achieve in the Netherlands.13 '
There, at the end of the 17th century, it not only gained full
acceptance but did so in displacing the last elements of Bartolist
theory which had been part of Dutch scholarship for a long time.
Where the French resisted the single-minded application of a
lex fori et situs, the Dutch welcomed it wholeheartedly in their
new spirit of feudal independence. Thus, d'Argentre's teaching
was responsible for the famous Perpetual Edict of July 12, 1611
which provided for the application of the lex rei sitae even to
such questions as that of testamentary capacity and the form of
the execution of wills. Nicholas Burgundus 32 (1586-1649) may
be considered the most distinguished and radical representative
of that trend. He exercised decisive influence not only on later
Dutch writers but in France as well. "Things do not follow the
person but attract the persons themselves.' 133 It is not surprising
that from such premises there could easily arise a conception of a
right "created" by the statute of the situs, a conception appearing
in the very title of the treatise of Rodenburgh (1618-1668) who,
directly and through the work of Boullenois (1680-1762),13
greatly influenced the theory of Joseph Story.
128 BATIFFOL, AspEcrs PHILOSOPHIQUES DU DROrr INTERNATIONAL PRivA (1956); also Louis-
Lucas, note 123, supra, at 805. For a purely philosophical universalist approach, see GOLD-
SCHmIDT, SISTEMA Y FILOSOFIA DEL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO (1948-1949); Gold-
schmidt, "Die philosophischen Grundlagen des internationalen Privatrechts," FEsncHIuFT
FUR WOLFF 203 (1952).
129 Mazeaud, "Conflits de lois et comptence internationale dans le domaine de la
responsabilit6 civile ddlictuelle et quasi-d~lictuelle," 29 REv. CRT. DE DR. PR. 377 at 382,
887, 398 (1934), establishing his thesis de lege lata and de lege ferenda; 3 MAzE&un, TaArr*
THORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE LA RESPONSABILIT CiVILE, 4th ed., 839 (1950). On French doc-
trine in general, see BATIFFOL 50.
130 In the drafting of the new civil code, Niboyet's vested rights (supra note 126) seem
to have prevailed. See Commission de RMforme du Code Civil, TRAvAux 1949-1950, at 618;
AVANT-PROJEr DE CODE Cvn 63, 220 (1955).
131 This analysis is based primarily on the sources discussed by I LAIN 396. See also
KOLLEVIJN, Hr BEGINSEL DER OPENBARE ORDE IN Hr INTERNATIONAAL PRIVAATREcarr (1917).
132 BURGUNDUS, AD CONsUErUDINEs FLANDRIAE ALIARUMQUE GENTIUM CONTROVERSIAE
(1646). See 1 LAINA 401.
133 1 LAINL 403, quoting from Burgundus' original Latin.
134 Boullenois' work, discussed notes 120, 122 supra, includes a French translation of
Rodenburgh's work.
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But the doctrine seems to have ignored much of the living
law. Only twenty-three years after the Edict of 1611, its insistence
upon the lex situs was "interpreted" out of its language where
the situs was not in the forum state. In 1634 the Princes rendered
the opinion that the Senate of Milan had not properly invoked
this Edict when it had declared void a testament executed in Brus-
sels in compliance with local requirements, on the ground that the
testament had failed to satisfy the requirements of the law of Milan,
the situs of the property.135 And Burgundus' teaching was in part
refuted by one of his contemporaries, Pierre Stockmans (1608-
1671), who, in angry language, castigated the "pragmatists" with
their "universal rules."'136 The soil was prepared for the Voets and
for Ulricus Huberus who, being averse to both the academic
strife of the Bartolists and the feudal preoccupation with the omni-
potence of the lex situs, may be credited with having swept aside
the dogmatic inroads in the basic character of the lex fori which
in fact had probably never ceased to prevail.
Paul Voet (1619-1667) still follows accepted statutist dogma
and merely anticipates new things to come by permitting both real
and personal statutes to extend abroad if comity so requires. This
comity became the basis of the theory of Ulricus Huberus (1647-
1694): how may one legislator compel another legislator of equal
rank to apply one law rather than the other? With the conclusion
that one declared incompetent in Holland cannot rely in that
province on a contract concluded by him in Friesland, though he
would there be treated as competent, 37 Johannes Voet abandoned
the later statutist postulate that questions concerning the same set
of facts must be uniformly decided wherever litigated. Although
the foreign domiciliary law may be applicable to the transfer of
domestic movables on grounds of comity, any sovereign state re-
mains free to apply its own law if it so desires. 38
Notwithstanding this courageous emancipation from univer-
salist doctrine, the Dutch school started from an unrealistic premise
which was to facilitate its conversion into its seeming opposite,
the doctrine of vested rights, the premise, namely, which apparently
had been inherited from the statutists, that the law of conflict of
135 See 1 LAiN- 400.
336 1 .ri-A 406.
13 7 See GAMn.iscHEc 174, 180.
138 2 JOHANNES VOET, COMMENTARY ON THE PANDECrs (Paris ed. 1829), Gane trans.




laws is concerned with relations between sovereigns. It is clearly
of no concern to any sovereign whether his law is or is not applied
in foreign litigation between private parties. But neither Asser's
anti-comity approach 3 9 nor Jitta's "ultranational" order based
on a law of humanity140 have seriously affected the consistent rea-
lism of Dutch scholarship,' 41 whose only reproach to Huber and
the Voets has been that they "did not further develop their funda-
mental idea."'1 42 This idea would have required abandonment of
the statutist tradition and the search, in each case, for "solutions
best suited to serve the real interests of human society and a good
administration of justice."'143 As to torts, Netherlands courts have
not hesitated to resort to the lex fori where justice so required, 44
and a Dutch scholar has developed a brilliant scheme of dealing
with conflicts problems in this field, which would favor a lex fori
controlled by rational rules of jurisdiction.
45
5. Germany
Such early German codes as the Sachsenspiegel (1215-1235)
and the Schwabenspiegel (1273-1276) were satisfied with the lex
fori even where contemporary Italian doctrine would have con-
ceded another solution. Thus, even the law of succession was ap-
parently always that of the forum situs.' 48 What was perhaps a
Bartolist interlude of nascent conflicts rules was dislodged in the
16th century, as it was in France, by feudal preference for the lex
situs. Mynsinger (1514-1588) and Gaill (1526-1587) have been
139 AsSER, AL4MENTs DE Daorr INTERNATIONAL PRIMV, Rivier trans. 30 (1884).
140 JrrrA, INTEnNATiONAAL PntvAATREc;r (1916). Cf. BEALE 95.
141 For a bibliography, see NjrmtR 371. See also Ofterhaus, "L'Universit6 d'Amster-
dam et le Droit International Priv6," FE.G=ABE GuTZWILLER 283-802 (1959); KoLILawIJN,-
GaEsc mnaDEIs VAN DE NEDERImANDSE wErENScHAP VAN HEr INTERNATIONAAL PRIVAATR.ECHT TOT
1880 (1937).
142 MEIJ ES 668.
148 Ibid.
144De Beer v. de Hondt, Hague App. June 16, 1955, N.J. 1955, no. 615, 3 Na.
TjnscHn. INT. P. 290 (1956), applying Dutch law to a French automobile accident between
nationals. But see for Belgium, Overstraeten v. Sainte, Cour de Cass. Belg. Mai 17, 1957
(Dutch law applied to Dutch accident between Belgians).
145 Drion, "De ratio voor toepassing van vreemd recht in zake de onrechtmatige daad
in het buitenland," [1949] REcHTrsGELEED MAGAZIJN TnaMIs 3, 64. Cf. De Nova, "Appunti
sull'illecito civile in diritto internazionale comparato," 4 COMMUNIC. E STuDi 7 at 18
(1952).
146 Beckmann, "Zum internationalent Privat-und Prozessrecht des Sachsenspiegels,"
1 ZErr. FOR VS Ecrr 894, 470, 476 (1907); NiEnman 87.
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considered as the most important representatives of this trend, and,
among their successors, Hertius (1651-1710) became an outstand-
ing follower of the extreme positions of d'Argentr6 and Burgun-
dus.147 Significantly, apparently for the first time in Germany,
Hertius refers to the conflict ("collisio") of laws-a terminology
which presupposes recognition of a foreign law's claim to appli-
cation; and Cocceji (1644-1719) was the first German author to
base his related theory on an international order closely tied to
prevailing natural law conceptions.
148
These and other "universalists" were strongly criticized by
Carl Georg von Wfichter, 149 who thus has come to be known as
the outstanding advocate of the lex fori. This much is true:
Wiichter, perhaps for the first time since the 13th century, con-
sciously and expressly put the lex fori into the center of his
system.150 But he, too, of course, recognized the need for cata-
loguing the situations where the lex fori, to avoid hardship, must
yield to foreign laws by limiting its own scope. Wichter's catalogue
includes the express or implied choice of law by the parties, certain
phases of personal capacity, domestic relations, succession and
formalities of legal transactions, always with proper regard for the
priority of coercive rules of the forum. 151
Quite improperly, I believe, Wichter's courageous abandon-
ment of earlier academic deviations is said to have been dis-
credited by the work of Savigny, that other great German scholar,
147 1 LAmE 408; GAMiLLiscHEG 163.
148 Earlier treatises merely referred to the extraterritorial validity of laws. See, e.g.,
STRYcK, DE JURE PPmcnl's ExTRA TnuuTORrum (1674). Trrus, JUR. PRIV. RoM. GERM. lib. 1,
ch. 10, "De conflictu statutorum eorumque in ceteros valore" (1709), introduced conflicts
terminology.
149 Wiichter, "Ueber die Collision der Privatrechtsgesetze verschiedener Staaten," 24
AncH. Crv. PR. 280 (1841); 25 id. 1 (1842).
150 But, in doing so, Wchter can claim a long line of later statutists who began their
investigations with the lex fori as the basic law. 25 ARcH. CIV. PR. 1 at 15 (1842) (e.g.,
Mevius, Stryck, Bohmer). Moreover, Wchter's theory seems to have been preceded by a
contemporary controversy. See SCHXEFNER, ENTWICKLUNG DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVAT-
ucmirHs 31-86 (1841), who had made short shrift of the "adventurous idea" of comity
which he had found foreign to actual practice. Id. at 37-38. 1 ZACHARIX, HANDBUCH DES
F zRsscusaEN' CiviEcrrs, 2d ed., p. XLI (1811) had treated conflicts rules as mere ex-
ceptions from the lex fori.
151 For adherents of W~chter, see PEuian, DAS PRINCIP DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVAT-
itEcHis (1851); MrrraRMAnn, GRUNDSATZE DES GEMEINEN DEars5EN PRIVATREC=Ts, 7th ed.,
§30, p. 115 (1847); PUCHTA, PANDEKTEN, 9th ed., §118, p. 171 (1868); POrrER, DAS
PRAKTISCnE EUROPAISCHE FREMDENRECHT (1845). See also THUL, EINLEITUNG IN DAS DEuTsCHE
PRIVATRECHT 168 (1851); THL, 1 HANDEESRECHT §17 ("In the first place the judge shall
apply his own laws').
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whose writings have acquired considerable reputation in this coun-
try-perhaps in part due to the fact that he paid his repeated re-
spects to the work of his contemporary, Joseph Story.152 But Sa-
vigny, like Wichter, rejected clearly and definitively the logical
circle of "vested rights,"'153 denied to any foreign law a right to
application, and thus recognized the lex fori as the fountainhead of
all conflicts law. 54 His great contribution was that he enriched
Wachter's catalogue of exceptions by his theory of the "seat of the
legal relation," and sought specific solutions for specific problems
on grounds of justice and expediency rather than dogma. 55 On
the other hand, Savigny is probably also responsible for the in-
ternationalist illusion of his successors.' 56 To him, the regime of
the lex fori was modified by an "international common law of
nations."'157 While, in Savigny's work, this modification was still
one in fact rather than by necessity, Bar 58 assigned to conflicts law
a supra-national power, and Zitelmann treated it outright as a
branch of public international law.'59 But universalist ideologies
have succumbed in Germany as they have in Italy, France and
the Netherlands. 60 Kahn, like Bartin,' 61 developed, for a new
152 Cf. 8 SAVIGNY, SYSTEM DES HEUTIGEN R6MISCHEN RECIHTS, BooK 3, 28 (1840).
153 SAVIGNY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 147 (1849, trans. Guthrie 1880). Credit for this argu-
ment should, however, go to Wichter, note 149 supra, at 25 AcH. Civ. PR. 4 ("petitio
principii"), or Kopi, ER6RTERUNGEN PRAXTISCHER RLECTSFRAGEN, III, 3 (1833). Notes 220-
223 infra.
154 SAVIGNY, note 153 supra, at 71, 78, 144. In the law of torts, Savigny even gave
greater emphasis than Wdichter to the lexi fori by refusing to admit defenses under the
lex loci. For criticism, see BAR, DAS INTERNATIONALE PRIVAT-UND STRAFRE CHT 317 (1862).
155 On Savigny in general, see GUTzwILLER, DER EINFLUSS SAVIGNYS AUF DIE ENTWICK-
LUNG DES INTERNATIONALPRIVATREcITS (1923); Gutzwiller, "Le d~veloppement historique
du droit international priv6," 29 REcunr. DES CouRs 289 at 353 (1929); EmuNzwmG 6, n. 2.
See also Maridakis, "Die internationalprivatrechtliche Lehre Savignys im Lichte seiner
Rechtsentstehungstheorie," FESTcSHRiFT FUR LEWALD 309 (1953); Gaudemet, "La th~orie
des conflits de lois dans l'oeuvre d'Antoine Pillet et la doctrine de Savigny," 1 M LANGES
PsI-'r 89 (1929).
156 See NUSSBAUM 21; BATIFFOL 285; BEALE 88. But see also SCHXFFNER, ENTWICKLUNG
DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATREOHTS (1841).
157 SAVIGNY, note 153 supra, at 70. See also id. at 145, where he points to the prob-
lems which would arise from a general use of the lex fori under our system of concurrent
international jurisdiction.
158 BAR, DAS INTERNATIONALE PRIVAT-UND STRAFRECHT (1862). See BEALE 89.
159 ZrrELMANN, INTERNATIONALES PRIvATRcrr (1897); ZrrELMANN DIE M6GLICHKEIr
EiNES WE.TREcTrs (1888). See, e.g., BEALE 91; NIEDERER 136; Gutzwiller, "International-
Privatrecht," in 1 STAMMLER, DAS GESAMTE DEUTSCHE RIcHT 1515 at 1532, 1538, 1552 (1931).
For a more recent internationalist system, see FRANKENSTEIN, INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECH'r
(Grenzrecht) (1926-1935).
160Notes 89-90, 127-130, 141-145 supra. Austria had withstood the internationalist
interlude owing to its specific code provisions. Thus, DAs ALLG MEINE BURGERLICHE GESErZ-
BUC (A.B.G.B.) §35ff. make the lex fori almost always applicable to contracts, giving
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"positivist" approach, a theory of conflict of laws based on the
lex fori.162 Niemeyer, in his proposals for the codification of
private international law,16 3 equally rejected universalist dogma.
And the German civil code, contrary to earlier drafts, has mostly
limited itself to circumscribing the scope of the lex fori. German
courts, presumably influenced by the conceptualistic jurisprudence
of the beginning of this century, have largely frustrated this
conscious choice of the legislature by re-interpreting" unilateral
norms" as "bilateral" ones; 64 but contemporary writers like Kegel,
Nussbaum, Raape and Wengler have reversed the trend.6 5
6. England
In the 17th century England knew valiant attempts at intro-
ducing the Roman law, as the law of reason, to govern relations
with foreigners. 16 6 But in merchant courts and admiralty the law
of the international community of merchants 67 was available as the
lex fori both to and against foreigners, upon both domestic and
foreign transactions. Common law courts had no need and, indeed,
no inclination to deal with matters foreign. Not until these courts,
owing to the decline of first the law merchant and then the courts
of admiralty, had begun to take cognizance of such matters under
prevalence to the law of nationality and intention. See, in general, WALKER, INTERNA-
TIONALES pRIVATRECHT 407 (1934).
161 BATWIN, PRINCIPES DE DROrr INTERNATIONAL PRIVP (1930).
162 Kahn, "Gesetzkollisionen," 30 IHERINGS JAHRBiCHER 1, 141 (1890).
163 NiEMEYER, VORSCHI0GE UND MATERIALIEN ZuR KODIFIKATION DES INTERNATIONALEN
PRvATREcHTs (1895).
164 See text at notes 329-339 infra.
165 Kegel, "Begriffs-und Interessenjurisprudenz im Internationalen Privatrecht," FESr-
SCHRrFT FUR LEwALD 259 (1953); NUSSBAUm, DEuTscHES INTERNATIONALES PRIVATREC-T
(1932); RAAPE, INTERNATIONALES PRrVATREcHT, 4th ed. (1955); WENGLER, note 16 supra.
But cf. Gutzwiller, "Fiinfzig Jahre Internationalprivatrecht," 23 RABELS Z. 403 (1958)
who expresses new internationalist hopes in his survey of recent history. See, generally,
BALLARINO, PROBLEMI GENERAL1 DEL DIRITrO INTERNAZIONALE PRIVATO NELLA RECENTE LITERA-
TURA TEDFSCA (1958).
166 See, for a vigorous plea, WISEMAN, THE LAw OF LAWS: OR THE EXCELLENCY OF THE
CIVIL LAW, ABOVE ALL OTHER HUMAN LAws WHATSOEVER 146, 161 (1647).
167 "And this law of Merchants hitherto observed in all countries, ought in regard
of commerce to be esteemed and held in reputation as the Law of the twelve Tables
amongst the Romans. For herein you shall find everything built upon the foundations of
Reason and Justice." Malynes, Consuetudo, vel, Lex Mercatoria (1686) 6. For an attack
against "Bartolus, Baldus, Justinian . . . and divers other Doctors and learned of the
civil Law," with their "many long discourses and Volumes and Books on the questionable
matters .... " see id. at 3.
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the common law of England did the problem of conflict of laws
arise.168
At the beginning of this new era, the lex fori was not threatened
as the basic rule. Owing to jurisdictional limitations, it could
(usually) be applied without hardship to either party. 6 9 Where
foreign contract law interposed itself, as it had in early continental
law, it did so as the law presumably intended by the parties, 70
while other exceptions from forum law were dominated by the
Dutch theory of comity.171 But here, as elsewhere, conceptualist
dogmatism gradually turned pragmatic exceptions into a scheme
of purportedly self-evident conflicts rules precariously hidden in
the obsolete statutist terminology.172
Westlake's text of 1858 (which saw its last edition as late as
the second decade of this century) was as much influenced by con-
tinental models as was its precursor, Story's Commentaries. But
Westlake remained fully conscious of the predominant role of a
lex fori whose application seemed justified by the choice of juris-
diction.17 3 Westlake, like Phillimore 74 may thus be considered
as Savigny's counterpart. Indeed, both expressed their indebted-
ness to this great German scholar. Since the American Wharton
limited himself to a comparative digest, 7 5 and Foote to a largely
uncritical re-examination of the case law, 7 6 it was left to Dicey
to introduce in Anglo-American law the product of continental
conceptualism at its worst, the vested rights theory, although that
theory by then had long been discredited in the country of its
168 See, in general, EHRENZWEIG 5. On early Scottish conflicts law, see Gibb, "Le droit
international priv6 en tcosse au XVIe et an XVIIe sicle," 25 REV. DE. DR. INr. PiuvA 560
(1930), particularly at 571 on the natural law approach of Lord Stair.
169 See, e.g., WEsmTLr, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 53, 91, 102, 153, 156 (1859).
170 See Dungannon v. Hackett, 1 Eq. Ca. Abr. 289, 21 Eng. Rep. 1051 (1702) (rate of
interest): Foubert v. Trust, 1 Brown Parl. Cas. 129, 1 Eng. Rep. 464 (1703) (marital agree-
ment). See NussBAum 15.
171 Cf. Robinson v. Bland, 2 Burr. 1077, 97 Eng. Rep. 717 (1760); Holman v. Johnson,
1 Cowp. 341, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120 (1775), per Lord Mansfield.
172 BUYRGE, COMMENTARIES ON COLONIAL AND FOREIGN LAws GENERALLY (1838); HENRY,
THE JUDGMENT oF THE COURT OF DEtERARA 1, 34 (1823).
173 Note 169 supra.
1744 PHILLIMORE, COMMENTARIES UPON INTERNATIONAL LAw, 3d ed., Preface, p. XV
(1889).
175 WHARTON, CONFLICT OF LAWs OR PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW INCLUDING A COM-
PARATIViE VIw OF ANGLo-AMERICAN, ROMAN, GERMAN, AND FRENCH JURISPRUDENCE (1872).




origin.177 Dicey's First Principle was that "any right which has
been duly acquired under the law of any civilized country is
recognized and.., no right which has not been duly acquired is
enforced.., by English courts."1 78
Some English writers continue, at least in part, to approve
this meaningless and therefore harmful displacement of the lex
fori,'1 79 but Cheshire" 0 and Falconbridge' 81 have abandoned this
approach. So have the editors of the 7th edition of Dicey who
have made the First Principle contingent upon "the English rules
of the conflict of laws."'18 2 Regrettably this complete abandon-
ment of Dicey's fundamental assumption is explained in a mere
note which may easily be overlooked.8 3 Nothing short of an open
break would have done justice to the entirely original work of
the editors who have, in fact, joined those rejecting all universalist
dogma and toiling for a proper delimitation of the lex fori as
the basic principle of conflict of laws. The history of the conflicts
laws of torts and contracts which I have more fully discussed else-
where 8 4 seems best suited to illustrate the hesitant progress of
English law.
Notwithstanding unsupported assumptions to the contriry 8 5
torts did not become a subject of conflict of laws until the middle
of the 19th century. To be sure, civil suits against British Crown
officers with regard to their colonial administration raised the
question earlier whether such officers could justify themselves
by reference to the colonial law.186 But these questions were
raised and answered in close analogy to those of criminal respon-
sibility which had been discussed ever since Bartolus' Commen-
177 Note 153 supra and note 221 infra. See also CHMHm 32. Holland's jurisprudence
had prepared the ground. See Nadehnann, "Some Historical Notes on the Doctrinal Sources
of American Conflicts Law," FEsTOABE Guzwuax 263 at 276-278 (1959).
178 DIcEy, A DIGEsT OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND WITH REFERENCE TO THE CONFLICr OF LAWS,
p. xlii (1896).
170 ScHmrrrHoFF, ENGLISH CONFLicr OF LAws, d ed. (1954). GRAvEsoN, CONFLICt OF





1 84 See note 2 supra.
185 See Smith, "Torts and the Conflict of Laws," 20 MoD. L. R v. 447 at 450 (1957).
Cf. BATIFFOL 260, stressing the analogy to crimes.
186 See Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 1 Cowp. 161, 98 Eng. Rep. 1021 (1774).
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taries187 Wichter 8s was probably the first author to deal with
tort conflicts on a more general scale, and it was he who ap-
parently inspired Willes, J., in his now famous opinion in the
leading case of Phillips v. Eyre.8 9 This opinion announced those
rules which are still treated as the basis of English tort conflicts
law. To both W~ichter and Justice Willes the foreign law was
nothing but a defense, while the lex fori governed supreme as
the sole basis of liability. In fact, even this function of foreign
law seems to have been limited to its use "as an authority or rati-
fication in the particular case, and on the peripheral question of
vicarious liability."'190
More fortunate than the United States, England has seen
those dogmatic attempts fail at their inception which would en-
dow the foreign law with the power to "create" a tort liability.1 9'
Indeed, we may wonder at the "metaphysical attractions of an
obligation springing to birth out of the soil at the possibly un-
suspecting actor's feet and hanging himself around his neck like
an albatross."'1 2  The feat of turning this nightmare into law
was reserved to the American Law Institute's Restatement of the
Law of Conflict of Laws. 93 But even in England dogmatization of
isolated legal rules has created new problems in both the tort and
contracts law of conflicts.
To be sure, the English tort rule which requires actionability
under both the lex fori and the lex loci is clearly justified as
to moral wrongs for which it was devised. But dogmatic gen-
eralization is probably responsible for the application of this
187 This persistent connection is well illustrated by Codex Maximilianeus Bavaricus
Civilis (1756) Part I, c. 2, §17, which deals with the problem of "different laws, statutes
and customs prevailing in loco Judicii, Delicti, Rei sitae, Contractus and Domicilii," and
clearly identifies "delict" in this phrase with a crime whose "punishment" is subjected to
the "laws of the place where it was committed." On the other hand, Part IV, c. 16 which
deals with "crimes and obligations arising therefrom," recognizes, in addition to "penal
actions," "persecutory actions" which inter alia include tort actions such as those under the
lex Aquilia (§6) or de effuso vel dejecto (§8).
188 Note 149 supra.
189 Phillips v. Eyre, [1870] L.R. 6 Q.B. I at 29. See FALCONBRDGE 809; Yntema, Book
Review, 27 CAN. B. RIv. 116 (1949).
190 Smith, note 185 supra, at 452. See also DiC=Y 941, 951. On this ground the much
criticized decision in Machado v. Fontes, [1897] 2 Q.B. 231, seems entirely proper, in
which liability for a Brazilian libel was found under English law. FALCONBRIDGE 820. Only
a vested rights approach could doubt the "logical" accuracy of this decision. Pollock,
note 13 L.Q. REv. 233 (1897).
191 See concerning Westlake's theory to this effect, Smith, note 185 supra, at 454.
192 Id. at 457.
193 See text at notes 213-223 infra.
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rule to "tort" liabilities which serve modern principles of enter-
prise risk allocation rather than the sanction of moral wrongs.
In such cases the lex loci delicti as such has no claim to applica-
tion, and other tests must be sought to supply such exceptions
from the lex fori 9 4 as may be required by the policies under-
lying each specific rule of enterprise liability.195
To illustrate: Where an Ontario plaintiff brought a suit in
Saskatchewan against his employer, a national railroad, for an
injury sustained in Ontario through the negligence of a fellow
servant, dismissal could well have been supported on the ground,
advanced by the trial court, that the forum should not have
taken jurisdiction. But it is unfortunate that the Privy Council
preferred to rest its decision against plaintiff on the purely con-
ceptualistic argument that the law of the place of accident had
preserved the fellow servant rule which had been abolished by
the lex fori.196 Should the decision have been the same if the
plaintiff had been a Saskatchewan resident? Since it was not a
"wrong" that had been sued upon, the defendant could not, in
its calculations, have relied on an antiquated common-law rule
widely abolished. The lex fori must prevail where the forum's
selection does not impose hardship on the defendant.
In other fields, the allegory of a foreign law creating rights
to be enforced or recognized in the forum has been even more
harmful. To be sure, the lex contractus which has left its fatal
marks in the American Restatement 97 has long yielded in England
to a flexible non-rule of "proper law," which is simply an ad-
monition to the court to consider whether a foreign law in the
particular case would be more appropriate than the lex fori-
to "inspect" that foreign law in the true sense of Bartolus. 198
But there are other problem situations in which the lex fori is
being given its due only in the circuitous ways of renvoi, pro-
194 Wortley, "The General Principles of Private International Law from the English
Standpoint," 71 REcuEmL DES coutss 5 at 59 (1947), advocates outright application of the lex
fori in tort cases.
195 See my papers, note 2 supra.
196 McMillan v. Canadian Northern Ry. Co., [1923] A.C. 120. See also Ehrenzweig,
"Alternative Actionability in the Conflict of Laws of Enterprise Liability: An American
Comment on M'Elroy's Case," 63 JuRm. REv. 59 (1951) and, in general, Ehrenzweig,
"Vicarious Liability in the Conflict of Laws," 69 YALE L.J.- (1960).
197 See, in general, Ehrenzweig, "Contracts in the Conflict of Laws," 59 COL. L. REv.
973, 1171 (1959).
198 Notes 70-72 supra. See also CuxSHmE 205.
6651960]
MICHIGAN LAW RVIEW
cedural characterization or public policy.199 England, like the
United States, seems entitled to a new start, discounting the du-
bious achievements of this dogmatic- century.
7. United States
In order to obtain a proper perspective in history and com-
parison, there must be excluded at the outset all those problems
which, while phrased in terms of choice of law, concern the
recognition of judgments or quasi-judgments, i.e., of individual
foreign governmental acts directed against individual persons.
Recognition of such acts is dearly governed by considerations
quite different from those involved in the choice of foreign ab-
stract rules which purportedly are better equipped to decide the
case at bar than the lex fori. In the former category we find
most of the earliest conflicts questions, such as the recognition of
foreign discharges in bankruptcy,200 or of assessments by foreign
administrative officers and the like.
20 1
Any attempt at classifying Story's general theory of choice of
law would be futile. He was an eclectic, willing to accept the
experience of England and Scotland in their mutual dealings
with domestic relations, to combine elsewhere the inconsistent
theorems of the Dutch supremacy of local law with the French
feudalists' wholesale acceptance of the lex situs, and to sanction
the internationalist ideology of his own time by endowing it with
the new name of "private international law."202 This much seems
certain, however, that Story was far from replacing the lex fori
by a set of a priori rules calling for the application of foreign law.2 0 3
Professor Beale thought otherwise. But for his contention of an
199 See text following note 243 infra.
200 See, e.g., LrvomdoRE, DISSERTATIONS ON THE QUESTIONS WHICH ARISE FRoM THE
CONTRARIETY OF THE PosrrvE LAWS OF DIFFERENT STATES AND NATIONS 140 (1829); 2 KENT,
COMMENTARIES 321 (1827); HENRY, THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF DEMmLARA IN THE CASE
OF ODWIN V. FORBES ON THE PLEA OF THE ENGLISH CERTIFICATE OF BANKRUPTCY IN BAR, IN
A FOREIGN JURISDICTION (1823).
201 EHRENzwEiG 31.
202 STORY 100-192, 7-38, 358-390. See Yntema, "Contract and Conflict of Laws: 'Auton-
omy' in Choice of Law in the United States," 1 N.Y. L. FORUM 47 at 51 (1955) ("derived
from a variety of conflicting views"). Cf. Nadelmann, "Some Historical Notes on the
Doctrinal Sources of American Conflicts Law," FEsTGABE Gurzwu.LER 263 at 272-276 (1959).
See also IRmER, "CoMrrY," NEDERLANDSE INVLOED OP HET REGHT DER VERENIGDE STAATEN 28-41
(1948).
203 Story's chapter on Jurisdiction and Remedies kept the door wide open for applying
the lex fori to both contracts and torts.
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early vested rights tradition of Anglo-American law20 4 he relied
on one English205 and one Massachusetts case,208 both of which
concerned the effect of "quasi-judgments" in bankruptcy 20 7 not
here pertinent. And such dicta in the Massachusetts case as con-
cerned choice of law refute Beale's thesis. The court did not
suggest that "an act or obligation valid by the laws of the place
where made was valid everywhere." 208 What the court did say
was that "as the laws of foreign countries are not admitted ex
proprio vigore, but only ex comitate, the judicial power will ex-
ercise a discretion with respect to the laws they may be called
upon to sanction. . .," and that the lex contractus does not apply
to contracts "entered into with a view to the laws of some other
State."
20 9
When Field prepared his Outlines of an International Code
in 1872, he was understandably influenced by the internationalist
ideology which was then approaching its climax. But, while
treating conflicts law as an essential part of international law,
he did not hesitate to state the "well settled rule founded on rea-
son and authority . . . [that] the lex fori . . . furnishes in all
cases, prima facie, the rule of decision; and if either party wishes
the benefit of a different rule or law, as for instance the lex
domicilii, lex loci contractus, or lex rei sitae, he must aver and
prove it."210 In 1875 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin felt able
to call the principle that a personal injury action was governed
by the lex fori, "almost too familiar . . . for discussion or au-
thority. " 211 As late as 1879 Rorer's text on American Inter-State
Law, while conceding certain conflicts principles to be based
on "natural rights," the "law of nations," or "universal law"
(including personal law and the lex contractus), starts with the
proposition that "the rule of comity will not be enforced as
against domestic law or the legal rights and interests of citizens,
or to their injury."2 12
204 BEALE 105.
205 Potter v. Brown, 5 East 124, 102 Eng. Rep. 1016 (1804).
206 Blanchard v. Russell, 13 Mass. 1 (1816).
207 Note 201 supra.
208 BEAT 105.
209 Blanchard v. Russell, 13 Mass. I at 4-5 (1816).
210 FIELD, OUTLINES OF AN INTERNATIONAL CODE 439 (1872), relying on Norris v. Harris,
15 Cal. 226 at 253 (1860), per Field, C.J., with earlier authority.
211 Anderson v. Milwaukee & St. Paul R.R., 37 Wis. 321 (1875).
212 RoRpR, AMERICAN INTER-STATE LAw 5 (1879). Emphasis added.
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It was left to Joseph Beale to implant in American law the
conceptualist thinking of his continental contemporaries. Dean
Griswold has said that "it is very hard to think of any other
field of the law which has been so much 'made' by one man."2 13
It will take many more to un-make his law, for Beale became
the author of the Restatement, and the teacher of many judges
and scholars who even today continue to speak his language.
Un-made this "law" must be, as the frustrated attempt by a great
man to make this a better world.
When Professor Beale began to teach conflict of laws in 1893
this subject was not taught at any American law school, and he
found no textbook usable for his purpose.2 14 His first course was
presented as one on "Conflict of Laws and International Law."
Notwithstanding his later emphasis upon the distinction between
the two subjects, his first casebook would seem to support the
conclusion that his thinking which equated interstate and inter-
national conflicts was very definitely influenced by an interna-
tional ideology.215 Only this ideology can explain his lack of
interest in interstate problems for which, indeed, a text would
have been available,2 16 and his all-pervading theory of "vested
rights."
Professor Beale believed this theory, around which he built
his Restatement and his treatise, to be an "indigenous" crea-
tion of the common law, whose earlier appreciation he credited
-with "a conceit, strange and . . inexpedient" 217-only to
Dicey's text with its "crowning quality," its "ability to keep clear
of the Continental writers. '218  But Dicey himself had acknowl-
edged his debt to "foreign jurists, such as Savigny, Bar, and Foe-
lix," as well as to Westlake219 who, in turn, ever since his first
213 Griswold, "Mr. Beale and the Conflict of Laws," 56 HARv. L. Rv. 690 (1943).
214 Ibid.
215 1 BEALE, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE CONFLiCr OF LAWS, p. V (1900): ".
questions of international law, which should properly be decided in every country in the
same way."
216 Rorer, note 212 supra, discounted in 1 BEALE, CONFLICr OF LAws (1935), p. XXX,
as of "no independent authority," "a summary statement of the doctrines of the Conflict
of Laws merely as they apply between the states, together with a considerable body of
constitutional law." Emphasis added.
217 Yntema, Foreword to RABEL, TnE CONFLICr OF LAws, A COmpARATIVE STUDY, at
XVI (1945).
218 Beale, "Dicey's 'Conflict of Laws'," 10 HARv. L. RFv. 168 at 169 (1896).
219 DICEY, A DIGEST OF THE LAw OF ENGLAND WITH REFERENCE TO THE CONFLICt OF
LAws, pp. vi, vii (1896).
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edition, had stressed the overwhelming importance of continental
writers for the development of English conflicts law.220 And those
continental writers, well-known to Beale,221 had discarded the
theory of vested rights, erroneously praised by him as "indige-
nous" to the common law, as perhaps the most harmful loan
from the internationalist doctrine of the last century.222  Fortu-
nately, a new generation of judges and writers in this country,
too, has begun to discount this aberration.223
C. THE BASIC RULE IN DISGUISE
As long as a quarter of a century ago, an outstanding French
scholar urged "that the role attributed to the foreign law is too
broad and that attributed to the lex fori is too narrow. We have
reason to assume that the lex fori has a strong claim to be ap-
plied to everybody, even to foreigners, a claim which to promote
we have applied considerable coquetry, and which is based on
the fact that the lex fori is the law most adequate for the coun-
try where the litigation occurs, and perhaps even most adequate
for the conflicting private interests. '224 I have tried to show in
this paper that this new stress on the predominance of the lex
fori is but a return to its historical mission. In a series of articles,
I have tried to show the need for a factual and policy analysis of
those typical situations in which American conflicts law should
continue to refer to foreign laws.225 This task might take decades
to complete. In the meantime, traditional formulas will fill what
we may hope will be an ever-diminishing gap. Personal law, lex
situs and lex actus will continue to force us to choose between
them. But, once relieved of dogmatic pretense, the choice can be
narrowed and simplified. In the absence of a different autonomous
choice by the parties, the lex fori will yield to foreign laws only
for specific reasons which may be more readily analyzed and
22 0 See, e.g., WriAXE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, 5th ed., 23 (1912).
221 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1916) added to the author's Treatise as an Appendix.
3 BE.L, CONFLICT OF LAws 1879 (1935).
2 22 See notes 153, 177 supra. See also, e.g., NUSSBAUM 27; Wicasm, DER BEGRIFF DES
WOHLERWORBENEN REC(rT IM INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATREcHT 7, 22 (1955). 4 PH-.LIMoRE,
COMMENTARIES UPON INTERNATIONAL LAW, 3d ed., Preface, p. XI (1889), still refers to
"acquired" rights entitled to recognition according to "reason and the interests of society."
223 See EHRENzwEIG 13.
224 Louis-Lucas, "Remarques sur l'ordre public," 28 REv. DE DR. INT. PR. 393 (1933).
See also id. at 442.
225 See note 2 supra.
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classified than those now allegedly calling for their a priori ap-
plication. Suggestions that the lex fori be thus restored as the
basic rule of conflict of laws often meet dogmatic criticism as
being "provincial," "nationalist," "defeatist," even among those
willing to recognize the realities of everyday practice. But, as
Justice Traynor has remarked, "The hazard is less of impassioned
provincialism than of the lingering ills of a passive formalism."2 26
The lex fori, in many different disguises, is about to regain
that position in theory which it has always maintained in effect.
In all countries whose legal histories have been retraced in this
paper, and elsewhere, the dogmatic interlude is drawing to a
close. In Italy, Mancini's postulates based on the law of nation-
ality have yielded to a new emphasis on the internal character
of conflicts rules, and, more generally, to a new "territorialism"
which, in effect, favors the lex fori.227 In France, Bartin, Lere-
bours-Pigeonniere and Batiffol have long overcome Pillet's in-
ternationalist flight into fancy.228 Neither the Netherlands229 nor
the Scandinavian countries since 0rsted's pioneering fight against
statutist theory have ever abandoned their realistic preferences
for the lex fori and the autonomy of the parties.230 In Germany,
modern writers have long found the way back to a functional
analysis of specific fact situations, in disregard of Zitelmann's
international dream and the conceptual jurisprudence of the
latter statutists.23 ' In England, Dicey's "vested rights" have been
emasculated by his contemporary editors who have joined Cheshire
in assisting the courts in the rebuilding of a modern doctrine.
232
In the United States leading judges and virtually all writers on
the subject, outside the American Law Institute, have begun to
build again on the "wreckage"233 left by the destruction of the
22 6 Traynor, "Is This Conflict Really Necessary?" 87 TEx. L. Rav. 657 at 675 (1959).
227 Note 88 supra.
228 Notes 126-180 supra.
229 Note 141 supra.
230 See e.g., MALMsrR1t, SOME ASPECTS OF CHARACTERIZATION IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW: LIBER AMIcoRuM BAGGE 130, 131 (1956); Hambro, "Autonomy in the International
Contract Law of the Nordic States," 6 INT. AND COMP. L.Q. 589 (1957). See also, in general,
Korkisch, "Der Anteil der nordischen Lnder an den Fragen des internationalen Privat-
rechts," 23 RABEL Z. 599 at 604 (1958);GjELsvxa, DAS INTERNATIONALE PRIVATRECHT IN NOR-
WwEN 37 (1935); MicHAELI, INTERNATIONALEs PRIVATRECHT 39-45 (1947).
231 Notes 162-165 supra.
232 Note 180 supra.
23 Traynor, "Law and Social Change in a Democratic Society," [1956] UNIV. ILL. L.
FoRuMs 230 at 234. See also Traynor, "Is this Conflict Really Necessary?" 37 Tax. L. REV.
657 (1959).
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Restatement's house of cards.23 4 And everywhere courts seek to
overcome antiquated "rules" and official theory by manipulating
these rules or their connecting factors, or by creating "excep-
tions" such as procedural,235 "preliminary," 236 and other 237 char-
acterizations of questions or rules, renvoi,23s fraud on the law,
23 9
"estoppel," 240 failure of proof,24' and above all, public policy.2 42
All these exceptions are designed to reach results indirectly
which could be reached directly by recognizing the lex fori as
the rule primarily to be applied. A brief analysis of some of
these techniques will readily show their inadequacy.
1. "'Public Policy" and "Ordre Public"
"The notion that the rules of Conflict of Laws can be de-
rived from some general formula or theory is responsible for
another doctrine-that of 'public policy'-which in turn has caused
the utmost confusion." 243 This statement of Professor Lorenzen
disposes, for our present purposes, of the controversy between
those who think that public policy is "peculiarly English and
smacks of the particular genius of the common law," 244 and those
who concede a much greater part to this concept in continental
law.245 In both legal systems the appearance of public policy
234 Note 223 supra.
235 Notes 279-296 infra.
236 Notes 321-328 infra.
237 Classic examples are the contracts characterizations of tort and land cases (see
Ehrenzweig, "Contracts in the Conflict of Laws," 59 COL. L. REv. 973, 1171 (1959)]. See
also notes 4 and 7 supra.
238 Notes 301-320 infra.
239 This term is not yet fully accepted in the common law. But see, e.g., FRANCESCAKXS,
LA nToRE Du RENvol 43 (1958).
240 See 2 MADSEN-MYGDAL, ORDRE PUBLIC OG TERToRrALrrr 822 (1946) (English
summary).
241 Notes 297-300 infra.
242 Notes 243-278 infra.
243 Lorenzen, "Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws," 33 YALE L.J. 786
at 746 (1924).
244 PATON, JURISPRUDENCE, 2d ed., 98 (1951). See also Winfield, "Public Policy in the
English Common Law," 42 HARv. L. REv. 76 at 98 (1928) ("part of the spirit of the
common law').
245 GuTrERIDGE, COMPARATIV LAW, 2d ed., 98 (1949). See, in general, LLOYD, PUBLIC
POLICY 73 (1953); LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIiRE, PRACIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIvt, 6th ed.,
288 (1954); MAURY, L'AvicrION DE LA LOI NORMALEMENT COMPkIfENTE 33-36 (1952); KOL-
LEwIJN, HEr BEGINSEL DER OPENBARE ORDE IN HET INTERNATIONAAL PRIVAATRECHT (1917);
and particularly Nussbaum, "Public Policy and the Political Crisis in the Conflict of
Laws," 49 YALE L. J. 1027 (1940); Kahn-Freund, "Reflections on Public Policy in the
English Conflict of Laws," 39 GROT. Soc. 39 (1954); Sperduti, "Ordine pubblico inter-
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coincides with the climax of those universalist aspirations which
undertook to displace the lex fori by a uniform conflicts law and
thus required measures to make such a law as harmless as pos-
sible to the law of the forum. Wherever that law continued to
need protection, reference to public policy, or the "ordre public"
was given an ever-increasing play as an "exception." Traceable
to the statuta odiosa of statutist eras246  (which, however, may
originally have merely limited the laws of the forum themselves)
and to the cautious and incidental reliance of Huber on the
forum's interest 47 (unnecessary under his rationale of mere com-
ity), the ordre public was moved into the center of attention by
Mancini2 48 and again by Bartin.
249
A historical study of the origin of the doctrine in Anglo-
American conflicts law is lacking.250 English cases habitually ad-
duced to prove early application are not in point.2 1 And it
seems clear that there was neither need nor use of the doctrine
in this field until the establishment of the vested rights doctrine
at the end of the last century.2 52 For here, as elsewhere, "public
policy" appears where the common law fails to keep "in touch
with the needs of the day. 26 3  The same observation applies to
the history of American law.254 Not until the era of vested rights
nazionale e ordine pubblico interno," 37 RIV. Din. INT. 82 (1954); LAGmAE, RECHERCHES
SUR L'ORDRE PUBLIC EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVA (1959); SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW,




249 BARTIN, TUDES DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL PRIV (1899).
250 Both English and American texts rely indiscriminately on cases decided prior to and
after the invasion of vested rights. See, e.g., CHESHnI 150; 3 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAws
1647 (1935). See also Katzenbach, "Conflicts on an Unruly Horse: Reciprocal Claims and
Tolerances in Interstate and International Law," 65 YALE L. J. 1087 (1956); note, 33 COL.
L. REV. 508 (1933). Paulsen and Sovern, "'Public Policy' in the Conflict of Laws," 56
COL. L. REV. 969 at 972, 980 (1956) helpfully distinguish the "classical concept" from the
"choice of law function" of public policy. On the history of public policy in general, see
8 HOLUswORTHI, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 56 (restraint of trade), 383 (contract) (1926).
251 Robinson v. Bland, 2 Burr. 1077, 97 Eng. Rep. 717 (1760) (unenforceable con-
tract under law of forum invoked by plaintiff); De Wutz v. Hendricks, 2 Bing. 314, 130
Eng. Rep. 326 (1824) (English contract unenforceable as directed against friendly govern-
ment); Hope v. Hope, 8 DeG., M. & G. 731, 44 Eng. Rep. 572 (1857) (unenforceable contract
bearing on family relations); Santos v. Illidge, 8 C.B. (ns.) 861, 141 Eng. Rep. 1404 (1860)
(interpretation of statute in terms applicable to foreign transaction); Grell v. Levy, 16 C.B.
(n.s.) 73, 143 Eng. Rep. 1052 (1864) (contracts to be performed in England).
252 For recent authority, see CHESHIRE 150.
253 8 HoLDSwoRTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAV 56 (1926).
254 See Lorenzen, "Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws," 33 YALE
L.J. 736 (1924); Paulsen and Sovern, "'Public Policy' in the Conflict of Laws," 56 COL.
L. REV. 969 at 981 (1956).
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which reached its climax in Beale's Restatement did public policy
become an essential part of American conflicts law and an addi-
tional source of its confusion. 215
In 1827 the Louisiana court remarked "that in the conflict
of laws, it must often be a matter of doubt, which should pre-
vail; and that whenever a doubt does exist, the court, which
decides, will prefer the law of its own country to that of the
stranger." 256  Story found "great truth" in this statement and
returned to its message in virtually every chapter of his analysis
without having to resort to an exception of public policy.2 57 Only
where past centuries had produced a semblance of rules "by
which nations are morally or politically bound,"258 was there
room in his work for such an exception. 259 Legislation at first
failed to alter this situation as long as judicial distrust left un-
disturbed the regime of the common law of the lex fori where
dealing with foreign facts. The history of wrongful death statutes
offers an example for both this early lack of conflicts law and
its later functioning by rule and exception. Such statutes260 be-
gan to spread through the United States after the enactment of
Lord Campbell's Act in England in 1846.261. Presumably owing
to judicial preference for the common law, forum statutes were
treated as local and limited to domestic causes of action, not-
withstanding early claims that these statutes should equally be
applied to foreign accidents, having removed a procedural limi-
tation262 or a defect in the common law.2 63  No wonder then
that conversely the common law of the forum was preferred to
255 CONFLICT OF LAWS RESTATEMENT §612 (1984).
256 Saul v. His Creditors, (La. 1827) 5 Martin R. (ns.) 569 at 595.
257 See, e.g., STORY 29.
258 STORY 71.
259 "Generally speaking, the validity of a contract is to be decided by the law of the
place, where it is made." STORY 201. But the lex fori re-enters as to contracts "against
good morals, or religion, or public rights." Id. at 213. The same rule and exception apply
to the "favored contract" (id. at 100) of marriage. Id. at 104. Limitations on the parties'
autonomy were rare. Paulsen and Sovern, "'Public Policy' in the Conflict of Laws," 56
COL. L. REV. 969 at 972 (1956).
260 EHRENZWEIG 4.
261 For abortive colonial legislation, see, e.g., CHARTER AND GENERAL LAWS OF THE
COLONY AND PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSErTS BAY, c. 8, 43 (1759), COLONIAL LAWS OF MAs.
SAcHusEmrS, 1660-1672 (Whitmore's Reprint 1889) 126; Conn. Acts and Laws (1750) 17;
Conn. Pub. Stat. (1808) 120. See, in general, Rose, "Foreign Enforcement of Actions for
Wrongful Death," 33 MIcH. L. REV. 545 at 552 (1935): " . . the body of the present law
is blemished by early preconceptions."
262Stat. 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93.




foreign statutes.264 But the universalist illusion of "governing"
conflicts rules had progressed far enough to compel, almost from
the very beginning, dogmatic rationalizations of this practice. As
early as 1857 we find the New York court refusing to apply its
wrongful death statute to a Connecticut accident because "whether
an act or omission affords a right of action depends on the law of
the place where it is done or omitted."2 5 And this rationalization
gained a life of its own when in 1880 the Supreme Court an-
nounced the ubiquitous applicability of the wrongful death statute
of any state in which "a right of action has become fixed and a
legal liability incurred.".266
It was then, and only then, that courts had to seek to con-
trol an over-generalized "rule." The first "exception," which per-
mitted the foreign statute to be enforced only if substantially
similar to that of the forum,26 7 promised preservation of the lex
fori as the basic law. But this principle was not acceptable to
Holmes268 and Cardozo, 69 judges steeped in the universalist il-
lusion of their time, who were about to lay the groundwork for
the grand scheme adopted in the Restatement, according to which
rights lawfully vested shall be everywhere maintained. 270  All
that seemed left of the lex fori in that scheme was the possible
exception, recognized with apparent reluctance by both these
judges and the Restatement, that the foreign law is to be ignored
264 Campbell v. Rogers, 2 Handy 110, 12 Ohio Dec. 855 (1855).
265 Richardson v. New York Central R. Co., 98 Mass. 85 (1867). See also Anderson
v. Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 87 Wis. 821 at 322 (1875), refusing to apply an Iowa
statute that had abolished the fellow servant rule: "The action here is a personal action,
for personal injury, governed by the lex for. This is almost too familiar a principle for
discussion or authority." See also Vandeventer v. The New York and New Haven R.R.,
27 Barb. (N.Y.) 244 (1857); Whitford v. Panama R.R., 28 N.Y. 465 (1861).
266 Dennick v. Railroad Co., 103 U.S. 11 at 18 (1880). This was new doctrine. Three
of the cases relied on by the Court did not concern torts. In the fourth case, Great West-
em Ry. Co. v. Miller, 19 Mich. 305 (1869), a judgment based on a Canadian statute, was
reversed on what amounted to a theory of forum non conveniens. And N. & C. R.R. v.
Sprayberry, 8 Bax. (67 Tenn.) 841 (1874), upheld a foreign tort claim for the death of
wife and children without facing the problem.
267 Wooden v. Western N.Y. &c P. R.R. Co., 126 N.Y. 10, 26 N.E. 1050 (1891). The oldest
case seems to be Leonard v. Columbia Steam Navigation Co., 84 N.Y. 48 (1881). Texas
and Maryland seem still to adhere to this test. See Paulsen, "Foreign Law in Texas
Courts," 38 TEx. L. REv. 487 (1955); Paulsen and Sovern, "'Public Policy' in the Conflict
of Laws," 56 COL. L. REv. 969 at 975 (1956).
268 Walsh v. New York and, New England R.R., 160 Mass. 571, 86 N.E. 584 (1894).
269 Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918).
270 In contrast to the draftsman, Professor Beale [A TaxATisE ON THE CONFLICt OF
LAws 105-107 (1916)] the Restatement has abandoned the language, though not the con-
cept, of vested rights. See, in general, EHRENzwEiG 9-10.
674 [ Vol. 58
THE LEx FoPi
where it "outrages the public policy" of the forum.27 1  But this
would not do. Only a few years later Chief Judge Lehmann
found it necessary to broaden the applicability of the lex fori
by, inter alia, excluding a foreign law as being "contrary to the
law of this state." 272  This broad test would, of course, exclude
generally the application of foreign laws. It is as unworkable as
its counterpart, Justice Cardozo's vested right. But both Lehmann
and Cardozo could have reached the desired result by abandon-
ing both "rule" and "exception," in favor of an outright appli-
cation of the lex fori.273
Similar difficulties in international conflicts cases have
prompted international conferences to recommend to the several
countries the classification and enumeration of those specific sit-
uations in which the public policy exception seems indispensa-
ble.274 But these recommendations remained unheeded and had
to be abandoned.2 7 5 Even such more definite categories as have
been developed both internationally and nationally as the alleged
"unenforceability" of "penal" and "revenue" laws are in the
process of disintegration.27  This fact "ought to have been a
warning that there was something the matter with the reasoning
upon which the rules to which it is the exception were supposed
to be based," 277 and renewed analysis of these rules should have
become the primary objective of scholarship. But "the princi-
pal vice of the public policy concepts is that they provide a sub-
stitute for analysis. The concepts stand in the way of careful
271 Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99 at 111, 120 N.E. 198 (1918). See also
Goodrich, "Foreign Facts and Local Fancies," 25 VA. L. REv. 26 at 33 (1938).
272 Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E. (2d) 597 (1936). Remedial characterization
was used as another ground of the decisions. See also Paulsen and Sovern, "'Public Policy'
in the Conflict of Laws," 56 COL. L. REv. 969 at 995 (1956).
273 For a pragmatic analysis of the problem involved in both Loucks v. Standard Oil
Co., note 269 supra and Mertz v. Mertz, note 272 supra, see Ford, "Interspousal Liability
for Automobile Accidents in the Conflict of Laws," 15 UNIV. Prrr. L. REv. 397 (1954).
See also Ehrenzweig, "Parental Immunity in the Conflict of Laws," 23 UNIV. CHI. L. REv.
474 (1956). For the role of public policy in the contracts field, see Ehrenzweig, "Contracts
in the Conflict of Laws," 59 COL. L. REv. 973, 1171 (1959). See also Ehrenzweig, "Guest
Statutes in the Conflict of Laws," 69 YALE L.J. 595 (1960).
274 Institut de Droit International, Tableau Gdndral des Rlsolutions (1873-1956),
Resolution of March 30, 1910, p. 277.
275 BATIFFOL 378. MADSEN-MYGDAL, ORDRE PUBLIC OG TErrOIALrrEr (1946) has
made a valuable attempt at saving both the rules and the concept by detailed classifications.
See id. at 813, 818 (English summary).
276 See EHRENZWEIG 131, 201.
277 Lorenzen, "Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws," 33 YALE L. J.
736 at 747 (1924).
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thought, of discriminating distinctions, and of true policy de-
velopment in the conflict of laws. '278
2. "'Procedure"
American doctrine started with the assumption "universally
admitted and established" that "the forms of remedies, and the
modes of proceeding.., are to be regulated solely and exclusively
by the laws of the place where the action is instituted." 279 This
principle goes back to the time when certain foreign laws were
first said to be entitled to "inspection. ' 28 0  Thus, when Balduini
formulated the "remedy" rule he merely confirmed the continua-
tion of the regime of the lex fori as against these new exceptions.
28
.
The rule was broadly interpreted, therefore, and presented few
problems.28 2  Only when the internationalist dogmatization of
conflicts law by the latter-day statutists began to require the ap-
plication of foreign law did procedural characterization assume
its modern function as the basis for exceptional applications of
the lex fori. In the common-law orbit this function is traceable
to Dutch doctrine.283  But it did not become significant until the
victory of the doctrine of vested rights, against which the lex fori
asserted itself as requiring its own procedures, 2 4 "machinery," 28 ,
or "remedy." 28n
278 Paulsen and Sovern, "'Public Policy' in the Conflict of Laws," 56 COL. L. REv.
969 at 1016 (1956).
279 STORY 468. For a history of the distinction, see Ailes, "Substance and Procedure in
the Conflict of Laws," 39 MicRs. L. Rav. 392 at 396 (1941).
280 Note 72 supra.
281 MEijEas 595, with additional sources. See also Ailes, "Substance and Procedure in
the Conflict of Laws," 39 MicH. L. REv. 392 at 396 (1941).
282The laws of evidence, execution, default, statutes of limitations, and arbitration
were included. MEijERs 615, 616.
283 Cf. STORY 472, quoting Johannes Voet.
284 Concerning the logical inconsistency between this doctrine and its "procedural"
exceptions, see, e.g., Yntema, "The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws," 37 YALE
L. J. 468 at 478 (1928). In contract cases the forum's remedies had always been withdrawn
from the parties' autonomy. Melan v. Duke de Fitzjames, I Bos. & Pul. 138, 126 Eng. Rep.
822 (1797). See, in general, Ailes, "Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws," 39
MicH. L. REv. 392 at 393 (1941).
285 Slater v. Mexican National R. Co., 194 U.S. 120 (1904) is probably the outstanding
case using this technique. In that case the Court, speaking through Justice Holmes, denied
a tort claim for periodical payments under Mexican law because the Texas court had "no
power to make a decree of this kind contemplated by the Mexican statutes." Id. at 128.
286 See, e.g., note 272 supra.
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That the dichotomy is analytically meaningless has now been
generally recognized. 28 7  But it seems equally clear that solution
of the resulting practical problems cannot now be sought in the
abolition of a distinction so well established in the language of
the courts.2 8  There remains the real need for a technique en-
abling the courts to restore to the lex fori some of the ground
which it has lost through the dogmatic generalizations of the
last decades. Thus, nothing would be gained by the discovery
that statutes of limitations, whether part of the right or "remedial,"
are really substantive because they affect the cause of action,28 9
that survival statutes must not be characterized as procedural as
was recently done by a leading court,290 or that statutes of
frauds,29 1 the standing to sue or be sued,29 2 or damages293 cannot
in any proper sense be treated as procedural to assure applica-
tion of the lex fori. But, like public policy, procedural charac-
terization should be used only as a makeshift device until the
law of the forum can again be recognized as the basic rule sub-
ject to displacement by foreign laws only under well-established
exceptions grounded on reason and policy. Then, and only then,
will it have become unnecessary to salvage the lex fori by such
devices.2
04
When Chief Judge Lehmann refused to apply Connecticut
law over the forum's prohibition of inter-spousal suits, he proved
too much when he claimed that "no other state can, outside its
own territorial limits, . . . provide by its law a remedy avail-
287NussAUM 187; Cook, "'Substance' and 'Procedure' in the Conflict of Laws," 42
YALE L. J. 333 (1933); LoRENzEN, SECT ARTICE ON THE CONFLICr oF LAws 336 (1947);
FALCONBREDGE 301.
288 Ailes, "Substance, and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws," 39 MicH. L. REv. 392
at 413 (1941).
289See EMUVZWEIG 128. Continental jurisprudence which favors substantive char-
acterization has hardly progressed further. See id. at 129, n. 1.
290 Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. (2d) 859, 264 P. (2d) 944 (1953). Compare Currie,
"Survival of Actions: Adjudication Versus Automation in the Conflict of Laws," 10
STAN. L. REV. 205 (1958); Traynor, "Is This Conflict Really Necessary?" 37 TEx. L. RPv.
657 at 670, n. 34 (1959).
291 See Ehrenzweig, "The Statute of Frauds in the Conflict of Laws," 59 COL. L. REv.
874 (1959).
292 EHRENZwmG 37.
293 See Ehrenzweig, "Contracts in the Conflict of Laws," 59 COL. L. Rav. 973, 1171
.(1959); and, in general, WoLPF 233, 238, 242.
294 Cook, "'Substance' and 'Procedure' in the Conflict of Laws," 42 YALE L. J. 333
(1933) would have the court apply foreign law wherever it can do so "without unduly
hindering or inconveniencing itself." See also note, 47 HAv. L. Rav. 315 (1933); Com-
ment, 10 LA. L. REv. 365 (1950) (contributory negligence).
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able in our courts which our law denies to other suitors." 295  Of
course, Connecticut cannot, in the New York court, "provide"
a new remedy. But New York may, under Connecticut law, grant
a remedy for Connecticut accidents. That it may choose not to
do so in order not to discriminate against those suing on New
York accidents is a question to be settled by re-formulating the
New York conflicts rule so as to extend the New York disability
to foreign accidents.296  Only such unworkable "rules" as that
of the Restatement which purports to require ubiquitous appli-
cation of the lex loci have compelled such unworkable exceptions
as that purporting to require general application of the lex fori
to all "remedies." Nothing less will do but a rethinking of those
conflicts rules as exceptions from the lex fori.
3. Failure to Prove the Foreign Law
Notwithstanding any foreign laws allegedly "governing" the
case, American courts have, in literally hundreds and perhaps
thousands of decisions, applied their own law, in reliance on the
often obviously unrealistic principle that the foreign law not
properly pleaded or proved may be presumed to be identical
with the law of the forum.297 Only rarely have courts assumed
an independent conflicts rule calling in such cases for the ap-
plication of that law as such.
298
The indispensability of such a rule is demonstrated by those
few but unluckily highly authoritative decisions in which suits
have been dismissed on the ground that the "governing" law
had not been established.299 When it is recognized, and only
when it is recognized, that the law of the forum as the Basic
Rule is entitled to application at the outset unless displaced by
295 Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E. (2d) 597 (1936).
296 For an attempt to reconcile the case law with a view to the parties' domicile, see
Ford, "Interspousal Liability for Automobile Accidents in the Conflict of Laws," 15 UNIv.
Prrr. L. Rjzv. 397 (1954); Haumschild v. Continental Gas. Co., 7 Wis. (2d) 130, 95 N.W. (2d)
814 (1959.)
297 Currie, "On the Displacement of the Law of the Forum," 58 COL. L. R-v. 964
(1958); Nussbaum, "The Problem of Proving Foreign Law," 50 YALE L. J. 1018 (1941).
On judicial notice of foreign laws, see also, e.g., Stern, "Foreign Law in the Courts:
Judicial Notice and Proof," 45 CALIF. L. REv. 23 (1957); 23 A.L.R. (2d) 1437 (1952).
298 See, e.g., Leary v. Gledhill, 8 NJ. 260, 84 A. (2d) 725 (1951).
299 Walton v. Arabian American Oil Co., (2d Cir. 1956) 233 F. (2d) 541, cert. den.
352 U.S. 872 (1956), relying on Cuba Railroad v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473 (1912). As to the
English doctrine to the contrary, see Currie, "On the Displacement of the Law of the
Forum," 58 COL. L. Rav. 964 at 967 (1958).
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a more appropriate law invoked by either party can the authority
of such unfortunate decisions permanently be discounted.300
4. Renvoi
English and American law have long resisted that peculiar
device by which a forum, having found itself obligated to apply
a foreign law, returns to its own law by invoking that foreign
law's own directives. And, indeed, until such an obligation to
apply the foreign law began to dispace confidence in a primary
lex fori, there was no need for this technique.
A significant illustration for this genesis of renvoi may be
found in a 14th century proposal of Ubertus de Bobio who, hav-
ing with apparent reluctance accepted Balduini's advocacy for
the lex contractus,30 1 suggests that the lex fori may still remain
applicable where the lex contractus itself does not wish to be ap-
plied to foreigners. 302 Once the conflicts rule for contracts was
firmly established on the basis of the presumed intention of the
parties,30 3 this rationale excluded, of course, the idea of ren-
voi.30 4 It is clearly absurd to argue that where the parties in-
tended a foreign law to be applied they also intended that part
of that law to apply which denies its applicability by referring
to another law. Such reasoning denies the very intention it in-
vokes. Conversely, where the lex contractus is not, or should not
be, referred to by the law of conflicts, in the absence of an inten-
tion to this effect, the lex fori should be applied without the
need for legalistic subterfuge. Not until irrational dogma had
displaced party autonomy and the lex fori as basic rules could
renvoi gain entry in the law of conflict of laws. 30 5
In 1882, the French court in the Forgo case applied the French
law of succession to the French estate of a Bavarian domiciliary
300 Where the court invoked lacks a contact with the case justifying application of its
own law, the suit might be dismissed as brought in a forum non conveniens. See EnHrqz-
waIG 119.
301 Note 62 supra.
3022 NEUMEYER 84. For other instances of early judicial decisions erroneously con-
sidered the "first manifestations of the renvoi doctrine," see Lewald, "La thforie du renvoi,"
29 REcuanL DES CouRs 519 at 533 (1929).
303 Note 84 supra.
3 4 NUSSBAUM 95. But see, e.g., Mason v. Rose, (2d Cir. 1949) 176 F. (2d) 486.
305 For references to the enormous literature, see, e.g., I RABEL, TE CONFLiCr OF




who had, in fact, lived and died in France.30 6 If at that time the
lex fori had not been replaced by an iron-clad internationalist
doctrine, allegedly compelling the application of Bavarian law as
the law of the decedent's legal domicile, the French court would
have been free to apply its own law in the absence of any reason
for another solution, and would not have felt impelled to intro-
duce into conflicts law a concept which has been called "heretic,"
"puerile," "paradoxical," and "burlesque," and has been accused
of "denaturing, falsifying and annihilating Private International
Law."30 7
There is little more to be said in favor of those well-known
decisions which have, belatedly and yet too early, introduced
renvoi in English and American law.30 s Were it not for dogmatic
"compulsion" to apply a foreign law by virtue of an allegedly
self-evident international allocation of competencies, the English
court would have had no difficulty in upholding under its own
law the will of an Englishman domiciled in Malta who had made
his will in England according to English law. To avoid the al-
leged "rule" that the law of domicile always "governed" the
form of making a will, the court had to resort to renvoi, and
probably incorrect renvoi at that.309 And when, on the other
hand, the court in a leading case invalidated the French will of
an Englishwoman domiciled in France (according to English,
though not French, conceptions) as violating a French rule favor-
ing her children, it could have done so by simply interpreting
the English conflicts rule as referring to the law of the domicile
determined by English law, instead of sitting as a French court
which in that case would have accepted renvoi.3 10
306 Cour de Cassation, Civ. June 24, 1878, D.P. 79.1.156, S. 78.1.429.
807 NUSSBAuM 92, n. 9, quoting from Lain6, "De l'application des Lois Etrangcres en
France," 23 CLUNEr 241 at 257, 260 (1896), and Pillet, "Contre la Doctrine due Renvoi," Ra.
DE DR. INT. PR. 5 at 9, 10, 13 (1913). See, in general, BA=OL 253.
308 For a history of this concept in English law, see Griswold, "Renvoi Revisited," 51
HARv. L. REy. 1165 (1938). See also De Nova, "Considerazioni sul rinvio in diritto inglese,"
30 Riv. Din. INT. 308 (1938).
809 Frere v. Frere, 5 NomS OF CASES IN THE ECCLEsIAsTICAL AND MArnM Couwrs 593
(1847). Cf. CH-EsHmE 76, also discussing other cases most of which are reconcilable as docu-
menting a favor testamenti. For criticism, see MENDEISSOHN-BARTHOLDY, RENvoi IN MoDERN
ENGLISH LAw 67 (1937); Schreiber, "The Doctrine of the Renvoi in Anglo-American Law,"
31 HAv. L. REv. 523 at 541 (1918); DicaY 80. For a defense, see Griswold, "Renvoi Re-
visited," 51 HARv. L. REv. 1165 at 1192 (1938).
310 In re Annesley, [1926] Ch. 692. For a criticism of that case as well as of the most
recent announcement of the Privy Council in Kotia v. Nahas, [1941] A.C. 403, see
CHEsHm 76, 81. But see, for a defense of renvoi, Inglis, "The Judicial Process in the Con-
flict of Laws," 74 L. Q. REV. 493 (1958).
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In the now famous, or should we say, infamous, case of In re
Schneider's Estate,3 11 the New York court applied the lex fori
in denying forced heirship under Swiss law in favor of the estate
of an American citizen against a New York will leaving the en-
tire property to an English devisee. The court could have done
so on the simple ground that the New York conflicts rule did
not require displacement of the New York law by mere virtue
of the fact that the New York funds were derived from Swiss
real estate. But it chose to establish this conclusion by a process
of multiple renvoi which was not only improper under New York
law but required misinterpretation of Swiss law in several re-
spects. 312
It cannot be a mere coincidence that the cases referred to by
Dean Griswold in defense of the renvoi doctrine3 13 are all ex-
plainable by a reformulation of the conflicts rule allegedly ap-
plied; 31 4 and those cases criticized by him as improperly reject-
ing the doctrine315 could have been satisfactorily decided by the
same technique. 16 Indeed, "the result is the same whether the
311 In re Schneider's Estate, 96 N.Y.S. (2d) 652 (1950), 100 N.Y.S. (2d) 371 (1950). The
facts appear from In re Schneider's Will, 298 N.Y. 532, 80 N.E. (2d) 667 (1948). See also
In re Duke of Wellington, [1947] Ch. 506, affd. [1948] Ch. 118 (situs of real property for
Idgitime). For other American cases, see FALCONBRIDGE 246. Cf. De Nova, note, 11 Gnm.
Comp. Din. INT. PP. 120-121 (1954).
312 See, e.g., FALCONBRDGE 233, 246.
313 Griswold, "Renvoi Revisited," 51 HAxv. L. REv. 1165 at 1186 (1938). Cases in-
volving transmission to a third law are not included in the present analysis. See id. at
1188. These cases are often explainable by formulating an exception from the primary
conflicts rule. See id. at 1194, 1199, 1203 (lex situs rather than domiciliary law in suc-
cession cases).
314 If X, the presumable owner of an automobile devolving to him under English
law from the French estate of an Englishman dying domiciled in France, takes the auto-
mobile to England, he should of course not be defeated in an English court by Y's claim
that French internal law, referred to by the English conflicts rule, would allocate the
automobile to him. Interpretation of the English conflicts rule as calling for the applica-
tion of English internal law to the English estate of an Englishman dying in a country
which does not apply its own law to foreign citizens, would suffice to justify this result
without resort to an acceptance of French renvoi. But see Griswold, "Renvoi Revisited,"
51 HARV. L. REv. 1165 at 1186 (1938). See also University of Chicago v. Dater, 277 Mich.
658, 270 N.W. 175 (1936), id. at 1207; and the hypothetical case, id. at 1191. The same
observation applies to the Restatement's renvoi as to title to land and validity of divorce.
See id. at 1203. For similar criticism, see COOK, Tan LOGIcAl. AND LEGAL BASES OF CON-
FLICT or LAws 246 (1949).
315 Griswold, "Renvoi Revisited," 51 HAtv. L. REv. 1165 at 1204 (1938).
316 In Gray v. Gray, 87 N.H. 82, 174 A. 508 (1934), a New Hampshire court denied
under the law of Maine a wife's claim against her husband for injuries sustained in a Maine
automobile accident. In order to reach the lex fori, it would not have been necessary to
resort to renvoi. Instead of weighing the policy of Maine as to the applicability of its
law to foreign domiciliaries, which Dean Griswold (note 815 supra, at 1205) suggests, the
New Hampshire court could and should have found its own law applicable because the
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foreign rule applicable to extrastate elements is looked to because
it is defined into the 'internal law' or because the reference is
to the 'whole law' of the foreign country."317 But increasing recog-
nition of the futility of accepted generalizations of "applicable"
conflicts rules seems to require their progressive specification as
exceptions from the lex fori rather than their correction by the
artificial process of renvoi, which would thus lose its last justifica-
tion as an "exception" from a non-existing international order,318
together with such tottering superstructures over a tottering struc-
ture as the theory of d~sistement which seeks to defeat renvoi by
an unwilling law, instead of refusing to invoke that law in pref-
erence to the lex fori.
819
Two examples may explain this thesis and its possible excep-
tions. In a series of articles I have tried to show that the appli-
cation of foreign enterprise liabilities is determined by a princi-
ple of reasonable insurability rather than by a reference to the
fortuitous place of the wrong. Once a court has decided that
the policy of its tort rule is primarily designed to serve the dis-
tribution of inevitable loss, and that liability under a foreign
legal system, being foreseeable and insurable, is a burden prop-
erly distributable by the enterprise, a conflicts rule of that legal
system is, ordinarily, irrelevant from the standpoint of the poli-
cies which have initially caused resort to the liability rule of that
system.
Occasionally, however, particularly in the law of domestic
relations, the application of a foreign rule may be required by
deference to a foreign governmental interest, as, e.g., where the
lex loci delicti was not pertinent at the outset. Modem courts have so held. See Ehrenz-
weig, "Parental Immunity in the Conflict of Laws: Law and Reason Versus the Restate-
ment," 23 UNIV. Cm. L. REv. 474 (1956). See also note 273 supra; COOK, note 314 supra, at
248. For a forthright rejection of the renvoi doctrine in a case involving interspousal im-
munity, see Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. (2d) 130, 95 N.W. (2d) 814 (1959).
317 Griswold, note 315 supra, at 1198. Dean Griswold's analogy, id. at 1193, between
the renvoi problem and that arising where the alleged conflicts rule refers to "no law,"
is perfect. But in both cases the lex fori remains applicable.
318 See Lewald, "La thdorie du renvoi," 29 REcUmL ns Conms 519 at 615 (1929); WoF
186; and, in general, FRANCESCAKIS, LA THEORIE DU RENVOI (1958). For the last author's own
views which reject the doctrine almost completely, see particularly id. at 150, 189, 260. Cf.
Ehrenzweig, Book Review, 8 AM. J. COMp. L. 233 (1959). But see also Maury, Book Review,
48 REv. CRrT. DE DR. INT. PR. 602 (1959).
319 WoLFF 198. Concerning the general rejection of renvoi by Scandinavian courts and
writers, see Korkisch, "Der Anteil der nordischen Lnder an den Fragen des Internationalen
Privatrechts," 23 RABELS Z. 599 at 614 (1958). For a similar attitude of Italian law, see
Migliazza, note, "Critiche sul problema del rinvio," 4 STUDI MEssINEO 209-264 (1959). On
Westlake's early use of the doctrine, see FALCONBRMGE 21.
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conflicts rule of the forum determines capacity to marry under
the law of the parties' nationality or domicile. Assuming respect
for that law to be the prevailing rationale of this conflicts rule,
it would be senseless to apply that rule also in cases where the
foreign law in turn is willing to defer to the law of the forum
either as such or as the law of celebration. This simply means
that the conflicts rule initially applied must be rephrased to
read that capacity is determined by the law of nationality or
domicile provided it purports to be thus applicable. Here, as
always, the concept of renvoi is dispensable and must be dis-
carded as "a classic example of violently prejudiced literature
confronting naively consistent practice."' 320
5. The "'Preliminary Question"
Had the lex fori been restored to its proper function a few
decades ago, we would have been spared another miscreant of a
conceptualism gone rampant in private international law. The
"preliminary question" would never have reached even that
modest standing it now enjoys in the literature of the subject.
To be sure not a single decision by a Commonwealth or Ameri-
can court has yet applied this new concept, but enough scholarly
investigations continue to appear on this subject32' to tempt a
court to use it as a much needed tool for the evasion of obsolete
conflicts law-unless we render this evasion unnecessary.
Succession to movables is generally said to be "governed"
by the law of the decedent's domicile.3 22 In a contest in California
320 1 RABEL, ThE CONFLiCt OF LAws, 2d ed., 75-76 (1958). Where courts have been
compelled to make renvoi an essential part of their practice as they have in Japan, such
practice indicates a fundamental flaw in the primary rules. See Ehrenzweig, Ikehara and
Jensen, "American-Japanese Private International Law" (forthcoming); Ehrenzweig,
"Torts in the Horei," EGAWA FEsrscSnR (forthcoming).
321See NUSSBAUM 104; Gotlieb, "The Incidental Question in Anglo-American Conflict
of Laws," 33 CAN. B. REv. 523 at 535 (1955); ROBERTSON, CHmcRAERIZATiON IN T E CONFLICr
OF LAws 137 (1940); Maury, "R gles g~n~rales des conflits de lois," 57 RECUML DES CoURS
829, 558 (1936); Cormack, "Renvoi, Characterization, Localization and Preliminary Ques-
tion in the Conflict of Laws," 14 So. CAL. L. RFv. 221 (1941); DIcEY 57; RAAPE, INTER-
NAMTONALES PrVATRECHT, 4th ed., 113 (1955); WoLFF 206; MELCHIOR, Dm GRUNDLAGEN
DES DEUTSCE INTERNATIONALEN PFRrATEECrs 245 (1932); Wengler, "Die Vorfrage im
Kollisionsrecht," 8 RABms Z. 148 (1934); RGAtx, LA THdORM DES QUALIFICATIONS E DRorr
INTERNATIONAL PRv 444 (1956); Venturini, "Le questioni pregiudiziali nel diritto inter-
nazionale privato," 11 Grum. COMP. Di. INT. PR. 184 (1954); Migliazza, "Le questioni
pregiudiziali in diritto internazionale privato," 26 TEMI 477 (1950); Bentivoglio, note, 12
Grum. Coamp. Din. INT. PR. 104 (1956); Lopez, "La cuestion incidental en derecho interna-
cional privado" 9 REv. Esp. Din. INT. 125 (1956).
322But see Yiannopoulos, "Wills of Movables in American International Conflicts
Law: A Critique of the Domiciliary 'Rule,'" 46 CALIF. L. REv. 185 (1958).
1960] 683
MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
between the widow and an alleged illegitimate child of a foreign
domiciliary concerning movable property located in California,
the decedent's domiciliary law will therefore be applied to de-
termine the relative ranking of the two claimants. The widow
asserts that an illegitimate child is not entitled to inherit under
the decedent's domiciliary law which determines this question
as "preliminary" to the principal question of succession. On the
other hand, the son relies on the more favorable California law
as the law of his own domicile governing his status.
There exists one good argument for the widow's contention,
namely that application of a law other than that governing the
principal question could distort the intended effect of that law
since that law's provisions are interdependent. In other words,
the decedent's law, the widow will argue, had it been faced with
the possibility of inheritance claims of illegitimate children-
which it was not since it has excluded such children from the
legal definition of children in general-would have specifically
excluded them from the right to inherit. On the other hand, the
son's theory would treat his status alike for all purposes, so that
a ruling on this status under one law for one purpose would
preclude its redetermination under another law for another pur-
pose. Usually, preliminary questions are discussed in relation
to the even more complex problem whether, once it is conceded
that foreign law applies to such questions, that law includes its
conflicts rules or whether recourse is to be had to the conflicts
rules of the forum.
No generally satisfactory solution has been suggested. Never-
theless one need not go so far as to see "as many problems as
there are cases in which incidental questions may arise." 323 Nor
need we be satisfied with announcing a system of friendly "co-
existence" of conflicts rules.3 24 The issue will lend itself to a
more definite analysis once the lex fori is restored to its proper
place as the basic rule. Where the lex fori has yielded to a foreign
law chosen by the parties to a contract, it has done so in order
to give effect to the parties' intention. Since this intention is
quite generally directed to the application of foreign domestic
323 DICEY 62, quoting Gotlieb, note 321 supra.
324 RAAPE, INTERNATIONALES PRivATREeRr, 4th ed., 116 (1955).
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law, the problem of renvoi cannot arise.3 25 Similarly, the appli-
cability of foreign law to incidental questions is but a matter of
intention. The same principle must apply where the lex fori
has been displaced on other grounds. The policy calling for
this displacement must equally determine its scope. Thus, if
the forum refers to the decedent's domiciliary law to determine
succession to forum property, it presumably does so to give effect
to the decedent's likely intention. In the above example he may
be assumed to have chosen not to make a will in reliance on the
fact that only his legitimate children would take under the law of
his domicile. Construction of the word "child" under the law of
each situs or status would be contrary to this presumed motivation.
On the other hand-to take a situation raised in connection
with a related though not dispositive Minnesota case 326-should
the status of an Illinois widow for the purpose of her wrongful
death claim brought in Minnesota against an Illinois defendant
be determined under the conflicts rule of the forum (which would
validate the marriage between first cousins under the Kentucky
law of celebration), or under the law of Illinois as the place of
wrong (which would invalidate the marriage of residents as vio-
lating her Uniform Marriage Evasion Act)? Suppose that the
"place of wrong" rule is established in Minnesota in the determi-
nation of a widow's standing to sue.327 If the defunct vested rights
rationale is properly ignored, Minnesota law has yielded in this
case presumably on the ground that a potential accident victim
has a right to rely on his own law in planning his financial pro-
tection by insurance and otherwise. Under this rationale he was
certainly entitled to rely on the law of his domicile also con-
cerning the status of his dependents. In other words, Minnesota
should apply Illinois law as the law of the victim's domicile whether
or not Illinois was the place of accident. The preliminary ques-
tion of the widow's status remains in this sense subject to the
conflicts rule of the forum.
3 28
325 Note 304 supra.
326A hypothetical case, discussed by Harper, "Torts, Contracts, Property, Status,
Characterization, and the Conflict of Laws," 59 COL. L. REV. 440 at 455 (1959), with ref-
erence to Meisenhelder v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 170 Minn. 317, 213, N.W. 32 (1927), in.
volving the Federal Employers Liability Act.
327 See EHRENZWEIG 46.
328 See Kegel, Commentary to Articles 1-31 of the Introductory Law to the German
Civil Code, SoERGEL, BORGERLicHES GGEzsrzucir, vol. 4, 8th ed., 16 (1955). The problem
has arisen with particular frequency concerning the right of a foreign-adopted child to
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6. "Unilateral" and "Spatial" Self-Limitation
One of the most significant phases of last century's struggle
between dogma and reality may be found in the controversy be-
tween the adherents of "unilateral" and universal conflicts rules.
This controversy is clearly reflected in the history of the German
Civil Code of 1896.329 At the time of its preparation the inter-
nationalist ideologies had probably reached their climax. Never-
theless, for reasons never fully ascertained, Parliament rejected
almost all those universal rules of earlier drafts which, follow-
ing these ideologies, had purported to distribute international
legislative competencies °30 Instead, it enacted so-called "uni-
lateral" rules which merely limited the applicability of German
law in the presence of certain foreign contacts. Thus, in lieu of
providing that marriage is "governed" by the law of the place
of celebration, the Code provides that "the personal relations
between German spouses are subject to German law."33' This
change, while probably induced by political considerations, was
in accord with the position taken by commentators, who con-
sidered universal rules as encroachments upon foreign sover-
eignties, 32 as inconsistent with the essentially procedural char-
acter of conflicts law,333 or as potentially contrary to public in-
ternational law.3
3 4
If taken literally, "unilateral" statutory provisions leave a
vacuum in many cases such as those concerning foreign nationals
engaged in foreign transactions. Assuming a distribution of
competencies by international agreement or uniform conflicts
succeed to forum property. It is the forum law that must determine whether a foreign
adoption is of the kind that would create succession rights under forum law. See De Nova,
"Considerazioni comparative sull' adozione in diritto internazionale privato," lFSTGABE
FOR MAxARov 730 at 739-763 (1958).
329 See NiEMEYER, ZUR VORGESCHICHTE DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECHTS IM DEUTSCHEN
BuRGERLICHEN GESMEzBUCHI (1915). As to similar statutes, see NInmm 122; WoL F 84. Cf.
particularly French Civil Code, Art. 3.
330 See, e.g., NinmuR 116; RAAPE, INTERNATioNALs PRVATR~cHT, 4th ed., 19 (1955).
331 Introductory Law to German Civil Code, art. 14. See also, e.g., id., art. 12 which
disposes of tort conflicts law with the provision that claims against Germans on foreign
torts are limited to damages allowable under German law; and in general Schnell, Ober
die Zustdndigkeit zum Erlass von gesetzlichen Vorschriften Uiber die rilumliche Herrschaft
der Rechtsnormen," 5 ZErr. FUR INTERNAMONALEs REtciT 337 (1895).
332NIMNER, DAs EiNFIHRUNGSGESz voM 18 August 1896 (Commentary), 2d ed.
(1901).
33 Concerning Zitelmann's and Frankenstein's theories, see WwmIbLTER, ENsErrGE
KOLLISIONSNORMEN AiS GRUNDLAGE DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECH S 9 (1956).
834 See, in general, KEOE., note 328 supra, at 8, 10.
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laws, these cases could be simply excluded from domestic juris-
diction after ascertainment of an available foreign forum. In the
absence of such agreements and uniformity, German courts, like
English courts since Lord Mansfield, have had to find a solution
in rules of choice of law. For this purpose they have by the use
of analogy applied unilateral rules as general. But this analogy,
far from being "almost self-evident," 335 is improper. Considera-
tions which lead to the application of the law of the forum to
foreign transactions do not necessarily support application of a
foreign law to corresponding domestic transactions. Article 7
(1) of the German Introductory Law, which makes German law
applicable to German spouses abroad, cannot "by analogy" be
said to imply that relations between foreign spouses in Germany
must be treated under their national law. Only a pseudo-interna-
tionalist-conceptualistic attitude could justify this simple equation.
This has been often recognized and whole new theoretical
systems have been aimed at a more accurate interpretation of
unilateral conflicts rules. Pilenko in France 36 and Sohn in the
United States337 may be taken as typical representatives of this
"school." 3 8 Both advise the judge inter alia to fill the vacuum
by applying that foreign law, and only that foreign law, which
claims applicability in the particular case.33 9 This approach seems
objectionable on the ground that it concedes to foreign conflicts
law a decisive role which may or may not coincide .with the policy
of the forum. The forum may prefer to apply foreign or forum
law notwithstanding foreign conflicts rules to the contrary. Both
Pilenko and Sohn, as well as all other "unilateralists," notwith-
standing their antagonism to internationalism in conflicts law,
335 NimEm. 122. See also WOLrF 94; IwrD, RItLES GhNALE 17 (1941); RAApE
INTERNATIONALS PRIVATRECHT, 4th ed., 33 (1955).
336 Pilenko, "Le droit spatial et le droit international privd dans le projet du nouveau
Code Civil fran~ais," 6 REV. I-1LLNiQuE DR. INT. 319 (1953); Pilenko, "Droit spatial et le
droit international priv6," 6 lus GEa Tu 34 (1954); See De Nova-Pilenko, "Uno Cor-
rispondenza," 13 DiR. INT. 198 (1959).
837 Sohn, "New Bases for Solution of Conflict of Laws Problems," 55 HARv. L. REv_
978 (1942).
338 See also Vivier, "Le caract&e bilateral des r gles de conflit de lois," 42 Rxv. CRrr.
DE DR. INT. PR. 655 (1953), 43 id. 73 (1954); and, in general, Wmm5TER, EINSErriGE KOL-
LISIONSNORMEN ALS GRUNDLAGE DES INTERNATIONALEN PRivATRac~r (1956); QUADRI 271-275,
289; De Nova, "I conflitti di legge e le norme con apposita delimitazione della sfera di
efficada," 13 Din. INT. 13 (1959). On the counterpart of this "introvert" doctrine, Ago's
insistence on the purely foreign-directed function of conflicts law, see De Nova, supra, at 14.
339 Refinements vary, particularly as to the solution of two competing foreign laws.
See WmIEULTm, note 338 supra, at 33.
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are themselves internationalists in that they deny the forum law's
predominant position by permitting the foreign law to "govern."
But the lex fori is the rule rather than the exception.
The thesis of this paper endeavors to preserve the traditional
precepts of conflicts law, now threatened by their failure as inde-
pendent "rules," by reinterpreting them as exceptions from the
lex fori. But this thesis can be fully established only through a
study which would re-examine the entire case law bearing on
each specific factual situation. In the second part of my treatise
on the Conflict of Laws I hope to complete a series of studies
which I have submitted as bearing on some of the more im-
portant conflicts problems of every-day legal life in the United
States.
